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Prior research has identified the manner in which human capital, social 
capital, and other intangible resources create value for organizations.  Among such 
resources, those contributed by a firm’s top managers have been singled out as 
particularly important for the generation and preservation of competitive advantage.  
However, the costs incurred to gain access to these resources, which reside at the 
individual and relational levels rather than at the firm level, are rarely considered.  In 
this dissertation, I focus on individual executives as the level of analysis instead of 
the traditional view of firms as unitary actors in order to study intra-organizational 
value appropriation.  I focus on the most direct and economically significant form of 
value appropriation by top managers: executive compensation.
I introduce a theoretical framework linking executive compensation to
executive-level intangible resources including human capital and social capital.  I 
distinguish between generic and firm-specific forms of capital due to differences in 
the causal mechanisms linking each type of resource to compensation.  Generic 
resources convey market power and are directly appropriable by executives.  Firm-
specific resources have no value outside the firm and therefore do not convey market 
power, yet they will convey a different sort of power derived from familiarity, 
visibility, and legitimacy.
Drawing on a sample of 71 executives from 36 publicly-traded US firms in 
high-technology industries, I provide empirical results that are broadly supportive of 
three of four hypotheses.  Executive compensation is found to be positively related to 
generic human capital (measured by the breadth of executives’ experience across 
multiple industries), generic social capital (external network size, external network 
range) and firm-specific social capital (the strength of intra-TMT ties, internal 
network size, criticality of internal ties, criticality of external ties).  I find no evidence 
linking executive compensation to firm-specific human capital.
These results demonstrate the hazard of focusing on the value created by 
human capital and social capital without also considering the costs firms incur to 
access those resources.
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Chapter 1:  Introduction
Value Appropriation and the Cost of Strategic Resources
Through this dissertation, I aim to contribute to the body of knowledge 
regarding intra-organizational value appropriation, which refers to the process by 
which value that has been captured by the firm is appropriated by individual 
stakeholders within the firm.  Research in strategic management has generally 
centered on how firms gain and sustain competitive advantages over rivals in order to 
appropriate value (i.e., inter-organizational value appropriation), while ignoring the 
issue of how this value is divided among internal stakeholders (Coff, 1999).  Internal 
stakeholders such as managers, shareholders, and employees will often have 
conflicting interests, and it may be possible to identify conditions that enable one of 
these groups to appropriate greater value.  Specifically, I focus on the appropriation 
of value associated with the intangible resources controlled by a firm’s top managers, 
including human capital and social capital.  These resources have been singled out in 
prior research as instrumental for the creation of value and competitive advantage 
(Itami, 1987; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  Yet given that these resources reside at the 
individual rather than organizational level, the individuals themselves should be able 
to appropriate much of the value.  Using executive compensation as the primary 
indicator of an executive’s ability to capture value and focusing on individual 
executives as the unit of analysis, I investigate the extent to which human capital and 
social capital influence value appropriation by executives.
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Top managers bring a range of intangible resources to the table.  Some of 
these resources are firm-specific, including tacit knowledge of organizational 
processes and routines, the ability to understand and navigate internal political 
processes, social ties within the top management team, and social ties with other key 
internal stakeholders.  Other resources are more generic in nature and can be 
redeployed in other organizational settings, including the executives’ educational 
background and technical knowledge, general management skills, prior work 
experience in related and unrelated industry environments, and social ties with 
external parties such as suppliers, customers, competitors, partners, financial 
institutions, trade associations and other complementors.  
These resources may generate substantial value for firms, but at what cost?
Cost and Competitive Advantage
The primary objective motivating most strategic management research is to 
explain how firms can generate and sustain a competitive advantage over rivals.  
Most definitions of competitive advantage require that the return from firm actions 
exceed the cost (e.g., Porter, 1985).  However, as discussed by Rumelt (2003), while 
most definitions of competitive advantage rely heavily on the notion of value 
exceeding costs, ‘costs’ (e.g., direct costs and opportunity costs) are ill -defined and 
poorly understood.  In particular, there seems to be a tacit assumption that firm-
specific resources have no cost because they are not tradable, and therefore non-
tradable resources are more desirable than are resources for which factor prices are 
well-defined.  Lippman and Rumelt (2003) refer to this as the ‘factor price fallacy’, 
and they argue that tradable resources should be more, rather than less, desirable.
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Executive human capital and social capital are not directly tradable, but these 
resources reside at the individual and relation levels, and the services rendered from 
the deployment of these resources are directly tradable.  By measuring various 
dimensions of executives’ human capital and social capital in this study, I seek to 
identify the dimensions that are associated with tangible increases in the amount of 
money firms spend in compensation to access the resources.  By evaluating the link 
between human capital, social capital, and executive compensation, it is possible to 
identify the specific characteristics of intangible resources that firms pay to access.
A central premise advanced in this dissertation is that the extent to which 
human capital and social capital are either firm-specific or generic should have an 
important impact on value appropriation.  Generic resources may be deployed in a 
variety of organizational settings without losing their value, and the portability of 
these resources should allow executives to directly capture the value generated by the 
generic resources they control.  For instance, if an executive possesses valuable 
academic credentials or connections with important government officials, the 
executive should be able to command greater compensation.  Because generic 
resources are portable between firms, the executive can make a credible threat of 
switching firms in order to obtain higher pay.  Resources that are firm-specific, on the 
other hand, do not convey market power upon executives, since the value of a firm-
specific asset in the next-best application is zero (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978).  
From an economic perspective, executive compensation should not be related to firm-
specific human capital and social capital.  From a social and political perspective, 
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however, executives may still be able to command greater compensation from firm-
specific resources.  This idea is developed and discussed in Chapter 3.
I test these hypotheses using a sample of 71 executives from 36 high 
technology firms.  The sample is constrained to executives in publicly-traded firms, 
for whom compensation data are readily available.  The unit of analysis throughout 
this study is the individual, and individual-level resources are linked to individual-
level compensation.
Definitions and Boundaries of the Study
Although more specific definitions are embedded in the text, I offer the 
following brief definitions of key terms utilized in this dissertation.  
Intra-organizational value appropriation is the process by which individual 
stakeholders within the firm benefit personally from firm activities.  This includes 
directly quantifiable revenue streams such as shareholder returns, executive 
compensation and labor contracts, as well as abstract, unquantifiable benefits such as 
surplus utility and satisfaction.  I focus here on the tangible, quantifiable benefits (i.e., 
compensation) accrued by one set of internal stakeholders: top management team 
members.  
In general, my analysis assumes that an increase in the value appropriated by 
executives diminishes the amount of value that may be appropriated by shareholders 
and other stakeholders.  In other words, I evaluate the value appropriation process by 
assessing the size of the pie captured by each executive, holding the size of the 
overall pie constant; the cost of executive compensation is ultimately borne by 
shareholders and other stakeholders in the form of higher accounting costs or diluted 
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share value.  This assumption does not account for any potential impact that executive 
compensation schemes may have on top management productivity.
The process of value appropriation causally follows and is closely tied to the 
processes of value creation and inter-organizational value appropriation (i.e., how 
firms capture value and utilize isolating mechanisms to prevent competitors from 
appropriating value).  Value creation and inter-organizational value appropriation are 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  Coff (1999) has argued that these subjects have 
played a central role in strategic management theory, and that the greatest unknowns 
relate to intra-organizational value appropriation.  
One reason why strategy research has neglected intra-organizational value 
appropriation is that the level of analysis is nearly always the firm or some higher-
level aggregate (i.e., industry, population, organizational field, strategic group, 
competitive arena).  The only way to address intra-organizational value appropriation 
is to focus on the individual as the level of analysis, as I do here.  Organizational level 
variables are also considered, but only in order to control for their influence over the 
relation between individual-level resources and individual-level compensation.
I focus on two sets of intangible resources contributed by executives: human 
capital and social capital.  Human capital is an individual-level resource that includes 
accumulated experience, skills, education, and other forms of knowledge (Becker, 
1993).  Social capital is a relational resource that includes the characteristics (e.g., 
size, range, strength, criticality) of the social networks executives maintain with alters 
located both within and beyond the firm.  Social capital is owned jointly by both 
parties to a relation, and as such exhibits ill-defined property rights relative to human 
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capital; however, individuals may exploit their social capital for personal gain.  This 
approach is in line with the work of Burt (1992, 1997) but in contrast with certain 
other research (e.g., Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 2000) that views social 
capital as principally a public or collective good.
Organization of this Dissertation
The dissertation proceeds as follows.  In the next chapter, I briefly review 
related empirical research and discuss how I intend to contribute to established 
streams of research, including research in the relatively narrow field of executive 
compensation, as well as broader schools of thought within strategic management 
such as the resource-based view of the firm.  In Chapter 3, I first discuss the process 
of intra-organizational value appropriation and how this process is driven by the 
resources executives control.  Then I advance a series of hypotheses linking executive 
compensation—the most important and most direct manifestation of value 
appropriation and the cost firms incur to access resources controlled by top 
managers—to human capital and social capital, with further distinctions between 
generic and firm-specific resources.  Chapter 4 outlines the methodology employed in 
the study.  In Chapter 5, I present the main results as well as a series of analyses to 
evaluate the robustness of the results.  In Chapter 6, I discuss the implications of this 
work for research and practice and identify some unresolved issues.
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Chapter 2: Gaps in the Literature
The purpose of this chapter is to review the most closely related empirical 
research in order to identify gaps in the literature and areas in which this dissertation 
may lead to the generation of new insights.  First, I review related research on 
executive compensation, particularly as it relates to human capital and social capital.  
Next, I discuss the relevance of this dissertation to research in strategic management, 
particularly as pertains to levels of analysis issues and also to the resource-based view 
of the firm.
Executive Compensation
The most direct contribution of this dissertation is to add to the body of 
knowledge related to executive compensation.  This contribution is made by shedding 
light on the link between executive compensation and both human capital and social 
capital, as well as by focusing on the important role played by the degree of firm-
specificity of these resources.
Human Capital and Executive Compensation
Several studies have analyzed the link between executive compensation and 
human capital, yet the results have been far from conclusive.  The most frequently 
employed measures of human capital have been tenure and, to a lesser extent, 
education.  The relation between executive compensation and tenure has been found 
to be positive (Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992; Barkema & Pennings, 1998), negative 
(Hogan & McPheters, 1980), inverted U-shaped (Carpenter & Wade, 2002), and non-
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significant (Deckop, 1988; O’Reilly, Main & Crystal, 1988; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 
1990; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995).  Education has generally been measured as 
years of formal education, which has been found by some to be positively related to 
compensation (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992; Leonard, 1990), 
but other studies have produced non-significant results (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996).
Even though prior research has addressed the impact of human capital on 
executive compensation, there are three reasons why this study has the potential of 
adding significant value.  First, virtually all prior studies have utilized coarse proxies 
for executive human capital.  For instance, though tenure is often employed as an 
indicator of firm-specific human capital, the time one has spent in a firm is likely to 
be loosely related to one’s firm-specific knowledge, and tenure may also serve as an
indicator of managerial power (Hill & Phan, 1991; Barkema & Pennings, 1998) or 
managerial entrenchment and inertia (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991).  In 
the present study, in addition to employing the commonly-used measures of human 
capital as tenure and years of education, I also introduce two new measures of human 
capital to reflect (1) the cross-industry diversity of each executive’s prior experience 
and (2) firm-specific knowledge of organizational processes.  Second, most prior 
research has focused exclusively on the CEO level, which may explain the lack of 
significant findings1.  Others have suggested that due to selection processes, there 
may be little variance in human capital at the CEO level, and the variance that does 
exist among CEOs is not well represented by coarse measures such as tenure and 
1 Exceptions include Fisher & Govindarajan (1992), who sampled SBU managers, and Carpenter & 
Wade (2002), who sampled the four top levels of organizational hierarchies.
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years of education (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Third, the present study focuses 
on technology-intensive industries, which are human capital-intensive and typically 
allow for a high degree of managerial discretion (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995).  
Social Capital and Executive Compensation
Although not nearly as common as studies of human capital, five prior studies
have explored the relation between social capital and executive compensation.  Based 
on a sample of 1402 top management team members of medium-sized and large 
Dutch firms, Boxman, De Graaf & Flap (1991) found a significant, positive relation 
between cash compensation and a two-item measure of social capital consisting of the 
frequency of contact with other organizations and the number of memberships in elite 
clubs.  In a sample of 111 managers from 28 underperforming Swedish firms, 
Meyerson (1994) found that salary was positively related to the strength of external 
social ties.  External network size was not significantly related to salary, though 
network size was constrained to a maximum of 15 ties.  Further, since the sample 
consisted entirely of underperforming firms, it is unclear whether the discovered 
relationships are functional or dysfunctional.  In a sample of 61 CEOs of publicly 
traded US firms, Belliveau, O’Reilly & Wade (1996) found that CEO cash 
compensation was negatively related to the social status (i.e., memberships on 
corporate boards, social clubs, etc.) of the firm’s compensation committee chair, 
measured both in absolute terms and relative to the CEO.  Compensation was not 
significantly related to either absolute CEO status (i.e., CEO status relative to other 
CEOs, rather than relative to the compensation committee chair) or social similarity 
between the CEO and compensation committee chair.  In the only managerial 
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compensation study to include internal social networks (i.e., social ties within the 
firm) in addition to external networks, Burt (1997) found in a sample of senior 
managers in a large investment bank that bonus pay was significantly related to a 
‘network constraint index’ which varies with network size, density and hierarchy and 
was designed to measure the extent to which an individual’s social networks bridge 
structural holes.  Finally, drawing on a sample comprised of 460 Fortune 1000 CEOs, 
Geletkanycz, Boyd & Finkelstein (2001) investigated the link between CEO 
compensation and a seven-item factor reflecting the CEO’s participation on other 
corporate boards.  External board ties were positively but weakly related to 
compensation, and this relation was stronger for CEOs of highly diversified firms.
Together, these five studies represent broad diversity in both methodology and 
results.  Social capital was alternatively measured as social status and external social 
ties, with only one study including (but not analyzing independently) internal social 
ties.  Three of the five studies confounded social capital with social status, which are 
often treated as separate constructs in sociology, with status following social capital 
(Lin, 1999).
Four factors set the present study apart from prior research linking executive 
compensation to social capital.  First, this is the only study to include both internal 
social networks and external social networks, thereby incorporating both generic and 
firm-specific forms of social capital.  On a related note, this is the first study to 
provide a theoretical framework justifying why both generic and firm-specific forms 
of social capital should be linked to compensation.  Third, this study employs 
measures of social capital that move beyond ambiguous but commonly-used variables 
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that confound multiple constructs (e.g., external board ties, membership in elite clubs
and other measures of status).  Measures of status are not ideal proxies for social 
capital, and they introduce doubts concerning the direction of causality: status is often 
considered an outcome of compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Finally, 
this is the first study to link compensation to the social ties of executives in a cross-
section of publicly-traded US firms.
Firm-Specificity of Resources and Executive Compensation
Firm-specificity has been singled out in prior research as an important and 
even defining characteristic of strategic resources.  Human capital theory (e.g., 
Becker, 1993; Hashimoto, 1981) has addressed the potential for market failure and ill-
defined property rights that may inhibit investments in firm-specific resources.  
Resource-based view theorists (Barney, 1991; Collis & Montgomery, 1995; Peteraf, 
1993) have argued that firms are able to appropriate value generated by firm-specific 
resources.  More recently, though, Lippman and Rumelt (2003) have countered that 
specificity is neither necessary nor sufficient for resources to be valuable for firms.
In terms of the intangible resources contributed by executives such as human 
capital and social capital, does firm-specificity increase or decrease the amount of 
value appropriated by the executives rather than the firm (i.e., shareholders)?  This 
question has been addressed in prior empirical studies, though without any clear 
resolution.  For instance, Harris and Helfat (1995) find that external CEO successors 
receive greater compensation than internal successors.  The authors contend that 
external successors will earn greater initial compensation than internal successors 
because they are forgoing the future value of their firm-specific skills.  Following this 
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argument further, however, leads to the conclusion that the only way to receive 
compensation for one’s firm-specific skills is to defect to another firm.  It appears 
implausible that firms would pay more for resources that are of no use to the firm 
than for resources that are of direct use.
Rather than inferring resource endowments on the basis of whether an 
executive was an internal or external successor, I provide direct measures of firm-
specific and generic resources for both human capital and social capital.  In terms of 
theory, I argue that generic resources are portable between firms, and executives with 
generic forms of capital (e.g., experience spanning many industries, formal education, 
social ties to alters outside the firm) will possess market power.  These executives 
have the ability to make credible threats to take their resources elsewhere, which 
allows them to appropriate value from the generic resources.  Firm-specific resources, 
on the other hand, exhibit ill-defined property rights, but may generate appropriable 
returns for executives by conveying a different source of power, one that relies not on 
market recourse but rather on visibility, legitimacy, and familiarity within the firm.  
By measuring several forms of generic and firm-specific resources and linking these 
resources to executive compensation, I am able to determine precisely which forms of 
capital may enable value appropriation by executives.
Additional Areas in Compensation Research
Though the extensive stream of research regarding executive compensation 
(typically from a strategy, finance, or economics perspective) has developed fairly 
autonomously from the even larger body of research on overall compensation issues 
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(usually from a I/O psychology or human resource management perspective), there 
are elements of the latter that can inform the present study and vice versa.
One central theme in compensation research has been the question of whether 
compensation is or should be set on the basis of internal equity and/or external equity 
(Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Cardy, 2001).  Internal equity compensation models 
emphasize fairness of compensation in terms of relative pay and pay that is 
commensurate with the skills, effort and time invested by the employee.  This model, 
also referred to as distributive justice, contrasts with an external equity or labor 
market model, whereby individuals’ salaries are compared to equivalent workers in 
the labor market rather than inside the firm.  Internal equity models are more likely to 
be employed in established firms operating in mature industries, whereas younger 
firms and those operating in dynamic and high-tech industries are more apt to utilize 
external equity models (Gomez-Mejia, 1997).  The current study, which focuses on 
high technology firms, is therefore more likely to involve firms using external equity 
models.
General compensation research is also relevant for the present study because it 
tends to analyze the micro-level processes behind the macro-level phenomenon 
studied in most executive compensation research.  For instance, much of the 
executive compensation literature is predicated on theories of power and dependence, 
including agency theory (e.g., Murphy & Baker, 1990; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-
Mejia, 2002).  But whereas these mechanisms are rarely studied directly in executive 
compensation research, and therefore remain a ‘black box’, psychology-based 
compensation research tends to study these processes in a more direct manner, such 
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as through policy capturing and laboratory studies (Stevens, Bavetta & Gist, 1993).  
For instance, Bartol and Martin (1988; 1989; 1990) studied the link between 
dependence and compensation, and how this link is strengthened by actions such as 
threatening to quit.  These micro-level studies can inform the present study and shed 
light on the specific processes by which executives engage in value appropriation.
The present study may also have implications for the broader area of 
compensation.  One limitation of psychology-based compensation research, according 
to Rynes and Bono (2000), is that studies rarely focus on pay determination with 
compensation as the dependent variable (which is the norm in economics, finance and 
strategy), opting instead to analyze some aspect of the pay determination process as 
the dependent variable.  Via the present study, I aim to identify macro-level 
phenomena related to the link between human/social capital and executive 
compensation.  The research findings may create new opportunities for future 
research to untangle the micro-level processes behind these phenomena.
Strategic Management
At a broad level, the present study contributes to strategic management research by 
focusing on individual-level value appropriation by top managers.  More specifically, this 
perspective exposes weaknesses in the resource-based view of the firm.
Levels of Analysis in Strategy Research
The well-established field of competitive strategy has shed light on the 
process by which firms compete against rivals to capture value and to generate and 
sustain competitive advantages.  While primarily oriented toward product markets, 
research in the field has also addressed competition in factor markets, such as the 
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process by which firms gain leverage over suppliers and alliance partners.  However, 
since the firm is virtually always the unit of analysis and is often even analyzed 
anthropomorphically, the question of how value is distributed among internal 
stakeholders (i.e., shareholders, management, employees, etc) is rarely addressed or 
even acknowledged as a valid question.  This limitation applies not only to externally-
focused models of strategy based on the work of Michael Porter (1980, 1985), but 
also to the internally-focused models exemplified by the resource-based view 
(Barney, 1991).
Treating firms as unitary actors is analytically useful for certain purposes but 
may very well lead to misguided conclusions for both theory and practice.  In 
particular, most strategy research implicitly assumes that what is good for the firm is 
equally beneficial for all internal stakeholders (Coff, 1999).  This would require that 
value is distributed proportionately among stakeholders, and that actions undertaken 
by individuals including top executives, middle managers, core knowledge workers, 
and all other internal stakeholders are motivated by a desire to influence the amount 
of value appropriated by the firm—the ‘size of the pie’—rather than how value is 
captured by different stakeholders—how the pie is sliced.  On the contrary, it is more 
reasonable to assume that individual internal stakeholders are more concerned with 
the maximization of their own personal utility, i.e., their own slice of pie.  The 
assumption of individual utility maximization forms the bedrock of economic theory, 
and although this assumption is often challenged, it serves as a formidable null 
hypothesis.  It is unreasonable to assume that value will be shared evenly or equitably 
within a firm, though one might seek to identify conditions when that occurs.
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The Resource-Based View of the Firm
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) is the research stream within 
strategy that has the most to lose by ignoring how value is distributed among internal 
stakeholders, due to the emphasis placed within the RBV on firm-specificity, social 
complexity, intangibility, and ‘human’ assets.  A central tenet of RBV theory is stated 
succinctly in a recent article by Wang, Barney and Reuer (2003: 50): “One of the 
most important sources of economic value for a corporation and ultimately equity 
holder wealth are the firm-specific investments made by its stakeholders”.  Resources 
that are firm-specific, socially complex, intangible etc. are presumed to be more 
likely to yield sustainable competitive advantages (Barney, 1991), yet they are also 
likely to be more difficult to manage (Coff, 1997), and these attributes may create 
greater possibilities for value to be appropriated by internal stakeholders other than 
shareholders.
My approach explicitly accommodates and evaluates the possibility that 
individual executives will appropriate value that would otherwise be accrued by 
shareholders.  As such, this approach is a response to a recent call by Blyler and Coff 
(2003) for empirical research that does not treat firms as monolithic entities and that 
considers the role of managerial resources such as social capital in value 
appropriation.  
In the next chapter, I outline the process of intra-organizational value 
appropriation in greater detail, particularly as it concerns executive human capital and 
social capital.
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Chapter 3: Human Capital and Social Capital as 
Determinants of Executive Compensation
Initial research examining intangible resources, among which human capital 
and social capital figure prominently, focused on identifying the value created by 
such resources (e.g., Barney, 1991; Itami, 1987).  To the extent that value 
appropriation was considered, this was generally limited to explaining how value can 
be retained within the firm, and how isolating mechanisms may be employed to 
prevent appropriation by competitors.  Recently, researchers have started asking and 
answering questions about the cost of strategic and intangible resources, and about 
the process of intra-organizational value appropriation, i.e., how value retained 
within a firm is distributed among shareholders, managers, and other internal 
stakeholders (e.g., Barney, 2001; Blyler & Coff, 2003; Coff, 1999).  Empirical 
research has begun to show that superior resource endowments may provide 
competitive advantage without providing superior firm performance or shareholder 
returns (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004), particularly when the resources underlying 
the competitive advantage reside at the individual rather than organizational level 
(Chacar & Coff, 2000).  Although rarely framed in terms of value appropriation, 
much of the executive compensation literature can also be interpreted through a value 
appropriation lens.  In particular, prior researchers have examined the link between 
executive compensation and both human capital (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; 
Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Harris & Helfat, 1997) and social capital (Belliveau, 
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O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Boxman, De Graaf, & Flap, 1991; Burt, 1997; Geletkanycz, 
Boyd, and Finkelstein, 2001; Meyerson, 1994).
In this section of the dissertation, I seek to contribute to the emerging stream 
of research on intra-organizational value appropriation as well as more well-
established fields of research (i.e., executive compensation, human capital, social 
capital, and the resource-based view) by examining the manner in which executive 
compensation is related to human capital and social capital.  On a conceptual level, I
distinguish between the ways in which value is appropriated from generic resources 
versus firm-specific resources.  Empirically, I incorporate multiple dimensions of 
human and social capital as predictors of executive compensation.  By doing so, I am 
able to identify the specific dimensions of human capital and social capital which 
generate real costs for firms.
The Value of Human Capital and Social Capital
In this dissertation, I focus on two categories of intangible resources—human 
capital and social capital—for two reasons.  First, as I outline in this section, these 
resources have been identified as playing a central role in value creation for firms.  
Second, as I discuss in a subsequent section, these resources ultimately reside at the 
individual and relational level, which implies that individual executives are likely to 




Human capital consists of the productivity-enhancing and income-enhancing 
skills, knowledge, experience and health possessed by individuals; these resources 
result from investments such as education and training (Becker, 1993).  Human 
capital first came to assume a major role in economic theory out of the recognition 
that theories centered on physical resources explained little of the variation between 
countries in economic performance.  Similarly, human capital has assumed a major 
role in theories of firm performance.  Scholars now widely concur that firm 
performance is more heavily dependent upon the deployment of human capital 
embedded in a firm’s human resources than upon the deployment of physical and 
financial resources (Pfeffer, 1994; Kogut & Zander, 1996). 
 While human capital has the potential of creating value at all levels of the 
firm, management scholars have emphasized the important role executive-level 
human capital plays in affecting firm performance and other outcomes (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Pennings, Lee & Van Witteloostuijn, 1998).
The link between executive human capital and value creation has generally been 
borne out by empirical research which has found significant positive relations 
between managerial human capital and organizational innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 
1989; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), corporate growth (Norburn & Birley, 1988), 
survival (Pennings, Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 1998) and financial performance 
(Norburn & Birley, 1988; Sherer, 1995).  However, the link with performance in 
particular has not always been direct and positive.  Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and 
Kochhar (2001), for instance, found a U-shaped relation between the human capital of 
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partners and the performance of law firms.  The authors interpreted their results as an 
indication that human capital may be valuable but costly, hence the link between 
managerial human capital and performance may be indirect (Hitt et al, 2001).
Pennings et al (1998) found the opposite relation, an inverted U, between human 
capital and organizational survival for Dutch accounting firms.  As has been the case 
for other resources (e.g., Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004), it appears that 
organizational human capital may have a stronger impact on outcomes such as 
knowledge creation, innovation, and competitive advantage than on financial 
performance and survival.
Social Capital
According to Adler and Kwon (2002: 18), “The core intuition guiding social 
capital research is that the goodwill that others have toward us is a valuable 
resource.” This value results from the information, influence, and solidarity ensuing 
from the goodwill (Sandefur and Laumann, 1998).  Goodwill in this sense is not 
directly measurable and would likely lead to tautological research findings even if it 
were measurable; instead, empirical studies of social capital generally focus on the 
attributes of social network ties (e.g., network size, range, redundancy, centrality, and 
strength of ties).  These ties include both internal (bonding) and external (bridging) 
ties, and the distinction between these two types of networks is often of theoretical 
value (Adler & Kwon, 2002).
The central hypothesis of social capital research within strategic management 
is that social capital facilitates value creation and is therefore related to outcomes 
such as organizational performance (Uzzi, 1997), innovation (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
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1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and survival (Pennings et al, 1998).  Among the various 
levels at which social capital may create value, the upper echelons of organizations 
figure prominently.  As in the case of human capital, top managers have a greater 
opportunity to be the “authors of their jobs” (Burt, 1997: 352).  Burt (1997: 362) 
provided empirical support that social capital is more valuable at higher levels of the 
organizational and went so far as to state that “Social capital studies of managers in 
jobs with large numbers of peers can be put aside as ill-designed.”
Social capital may be defined at the individual level, or at the level of a 
collectivity such as a group, firm, organizational field, community or nation (Kilduff 
& Tsai, 2003).  The choice between the individual and the collective as the level of 
analysis for social capital is not merely a methodological choice, but rather an 
ideological one.  Approaches that focus on collective social capital (e.g., Leana & 
Van Buren, 1999; Putnam, 1995) are predicated on the public goods aspect of social 
capital (Coleman, 1990).  Because social capital reflects the degree of social 
embeddedness and shared values within a collectivity, the beneficial outcomes 
associated with social capital are often presumed to be accrued by the collective 
rather than by specific individuals (Portes & Sensenbruner, 1993).  Approaches that 
focus on individual social capital (e.g., Burt, 1997) relax the assumption that value 
creation will inherently lead to collective value appropriation.  Instead, whether 
individuals and/or collectivities will appropriate value created by social capital may 
only be answered by adopting a multi-level analytical approach.
The greatest number of contributions related to the individual-level benefits of 
social capital pertain to job mobility.  Individual social capital has been found to be 
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linked to both inter-organizational mobility (i.e., finding a job with a new employer) 
and intra-organizational mobility (i.e., being promoted).  Granovetter (1973) argued 
that weak ties are more likely to be helpful in finding a job than strong ties because 
weak ties are more likely to provide access to non-redundant information.  This 
hypothesis has received broad support (Granovetter, 1974), though it has been 
acknowledged that the causal factor is the extent to which the tie bridges structural 
holes rather than tie weakness (Burt, 1992).  See Lin (1999) for a review of studies 
linking individual social capital to status attainment, of which inter-organizational 
mobility is a key indicator.  Looking at inter-organizational mobility from the other 
side of the employment contract, employers also benefit from using social capital to 
conduct recruitment and hiring (Fernandez, Castilla & Moore, 2000).  In terms of 
intra-organizational mobility, social capital generally facilitates promotion within a 
firm.  Specifically, promotion rates are higher among individuals whose social 
networks bridge structural holes (Burt, 1997), but the likelihood of promotion is also 
higher among individuals whose networks exhibit greater homophily (Ibarra, 1992).  
Podolny and Baron (1997) partially reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings
by identifying the type of tie as a crucial contingency, such that sparse boundary-
spanning ties are valuable for task-advice ties but that dense, cohesive networks are 
valuable for buy-in ties.
Resource Specificity and Value Appropriation
In the sections that follow, I distinguish between generic and firm-specific 
forms of human and social capital.  Although I argue that executives will be able to 
appropriate value from both generic and firm-specific resources, the causal 
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mechanisms underlying value appropriation in the two cases will be very different.  
Generic resources convey market power upon executives, whereas firm-specific 
resources convey institutional power.  Moreover, the distinction between generic and 
firm-specific resources is crucial in order to compare the value appropriated by 
executives with the value appropriated by shareholders, as I do in Chapter 4.
Control of Generic Resources Conveys Market Power
I use the term generic resources to refer to all resources that are not firm-
specific (Becker, 1993).  Generic resources are still likely to be specialized if they are 
to be valuable and rare, but the nature of their specificity differs importantly from 
firm-specific resources.  Resources that are specialized but not firm-specific, such as 
industry-, country-, and technology-specific resources, may be somewhat illiquid due 
to thin markets, but they (or the services they render) remain tradable.  Firm-specific 
resources, on the other hand, have diminished value when deployed outside a 
particular firm.  Firm-specific resources have been singled out within the resource-
based view as playing a crucial role in the creation of sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991).  However, while strategically important resources are 
often firm-specific, specificity itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a 
resource valuable.  In fact, ceteris paribus, tradable resources should be more
desirable (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003).
Generic resources are either directly tradable or are capable of rendering 
services that are directly tradable.  We can therefore refer to generic resources as 
portable.  For instance, credentials such as a law degree or CPA status are not directly 
tradable, but services rendered by the human capital underlying these credentials are
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easily traded and are amenable to market valuation.  Likewise, social ties are rarely 
bought and sold, but may be possible to place a monetary value on the services they 
render, such as through brokerage fees.  By controlling scarce yet portable resources
embodied in their human capital and social capital, executives may be able to ensure 
that their own switching costs are less than their firms’ switching costs.  In other 
words, these executives derive market power from the establishment of small 
numbers bargaining for only one party involved in a transaction.
Market power is not impeded by the fact that human capital and social capital 
are inseparable from the executives in whom these intangible resources are 
embedded.  As long as the resources are not firm-specific, the services they render 
may be re-deployed in other firms, thus altering the amount of value an executive 
appropriates.  For instance, at the CEO level, outside successors generally earn more
than internal successors (Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1992; Joskow, Rose, & Shephard, 
1993; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Harris & Helfat, 1997).  Harris and Helfat 
(1997), who found that successors from outside the industry receive the greatest 
compensation, followed by outsiders from within the industry then by internal 
successors, have interpreted this finding as signifying that external successors are 
being compensated for the firm-specific human capital foregone when they switch 
firms.  In complete contrast with these authors, I believe these results indicate that 
external successors receive greater compensation because their skill set is more 
generic in nature, and therefore conveys market power.  Internal successors, in 
contrast, cannot make a credible threat of switching firms to appropriate greater 
value, because their resources would be less valuable in another firm.
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Control of Firm-Specific Resources Conveys Institutional Power
If a resource is entirely firm-specific, it is not portable and cannot convey 
market power, since the value generated by the resource in its next-best application is 
zero (Becker, 1993: 41-42; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).  The only recourse 
available to the resource owner is to withhold the resource from use (e.g., voluntary 
turnover in the employment context), which would force the resource owner to forego 
compensation for firm-specific resources.  In economic terms, a firm should be able 
to retain valuable human capital and social capital by distributing only a small portion 
of the value generated.  The opportunity cost of resources that are entirely firm-
specific is zero, and a firm need only pay a trivial amount to exploit existing firm-
specific resources (Klein et al, 1978).  The only reason a firm would pay more would 
be to provide a monetary incentive (i.e., a sort of efficiency wage) for employees to 
work harder and to make future investments in firm-specific resources (Becker, 1993: 
40-51; Peteraf, 1993).  Such incentives may not even be necessary or useful, given 
that many firm-specific resources such as intra-firm social networks and tacit 
knowledge of organizational processes are often by-products of other activities and 
result from the deployment of existing resources, rather than resulting from purposive 
investments (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  In 
certain cases, particularly for social capital, attempts to purposely invest in firm-
specific resources may be completely counter-productive.  As Burt (1992: 24-25)
states regarding blatantly instrumental approaches to managing social capital:
“Judging friends on the basis of efficiency is an interpersonal flatulence from which 
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friends will flee.”  This leads one to the conclusion that firms will appropriate the 
lion’s share of value created by firm-specific resources.
Why, then, might firms provide seemingly needless compensation for firm-
specific resources?  To begin to answer this question, one must consider that the 
managerial labor market is an economically imperfect market (Simon, 1951), and 
firms are social institutions driven by social norms and political forces in addition to 
market forces (Scott, 1995).  Firm-specific resources will not convey market power, 
but they may convey other benefits upon executives, such as legitimacy, visibility, 
access to information, and influence. For instance, an executive who possesses 
unique tacit, firm-specific knowledge resulting from having spent her entire career 
within a single firm would find it hard to make a credible threat to defect to a rival 
firm; however, her unique understanding of organizational processes and politics 
makes it unlikely that she would need to make such a threat anyway.  Instead, an 
individual possessing such resources is likely to have considerable direct and indirect 
influence over resource allocation decisions within the firm, including her own 
compensation.  This may result from the overt exercising of power, from more covert 
forms of influencing outcomes by exploiting information asymmetries, or even from 
completely subconscious process of social comparison and social influence.  I refer to 
influence that is based on the control of firm-specific resources rather than on 
tradable resources as institutional power.
Value appropriation processes in general are likely to be driven by a 
combination of economic, social and political processes.  Economic processes are 
likely to play a dominant role in driving inter-organizational value appropriation (i.e., 
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how firms compete against each other to capture value), but this role is likely to 
diminish for intra-organizational value appropriation (i.e., how individuals within a 
firm position themselves to capture value).  In contrast, social and political processes 
will play a stronger role in intra-organizational value appropriation than in inter-
organizational value appropriation.  This is due to the fact that organizations represent 
a fundamentally different means of governing transactions, one in which an ex ante 
large numbers condition is transformed into a small-numbers relation (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985).
In the specific case of value appropriation by executives, empirical evidence
indicates that political and social processes have a substantial impact on executive 
compensation.  Executive compensation among publicly traded US firms is 
characterized by a seemingly paradoxical combination of high visibility and low
transparency.  Compensation is visible because SEC rules mandate that firms disclose 
the form and amount of compensation received by up to five executives.  The 
visibility of executive pay encourages social comparison processes whereby 
executives are compared to ‘comparable’ executives at ‘comparable’ firms (O’Reilly, 
Main & Crystal, 1988; Belliveau, O’Reilly & Wade, 1996).  Because pay is visible, 
compensation serves not only as a monetary form of appropriation but also as an 
indicator of status.  Compensation consultants are commonly employed to guide the 
process of social comparison.  At the same time, however, visible ex post 
compensation amounts may be contrasted with opaque ex ante compensation 
schemes.  Certain actions, such as the announcement of incentive plans that are not 
implemented (Westphal & Zajac, 1994), may act as symbolic actions that obscure the 
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actual basis upon which compensation is determined.  The pay received by 
‘comparable’ executives at other firms is fairly transparent, but the basis upon which 
‘comparable’ firms are identified is not (Porac, Wade & Pollock, 1999).  Even 
incentive structures that are explicitly designed to align the interests of executives and 
shareholders, such as stock options, may detract from transparency by masking the 
costs borne by shareholders.  Additional elements of executive value appropriation 
that may lack transparency and promote political posturing and opportunism include 
options re-pricing (Pollock, Fischer & Wade, 2002), insider trading (Coff & Lee, 
2002), payments to departing executives, and stealth compensation (Bebchuk, Fried 
& Walker, 2002).
Together, the high visibility and low transparency of executive pay allow 
executives to ‘game’ the system.  The greater the amount of firm-specific resources 
an executive controls, the better the executive is likely to be at playing the game.  For 
more overt political processes, executives may secure increased compensation by 
controlling information flows and exploiting social relations.  For more covert and 
even sub-conscious social processes, executives may benefit from the legitimacy, 
visibility, and familiarity conveyed by firm-specific resources2.
I have argued that market forces are the main factor behind the link between 
generic resources and executive compensation, and that social forces play a more 
dominant role than market forces in linking firm-specific resources to executive 
compensation.  However, market and social/institutional forces work in tandem in 
both cases, and it is neither possible nor necessary to separate the two.  For instance, 
firms may not need to provide significant amounts of compensation in order to induce 
2 Note the contrast with market power, which depends on scarcity.
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managers to contribute their existing firm-specific resources, since these resources 
command little if any market value.  I have argued that the reason these resources are 
likely to be positively related to compensation is that executives who command 
substantial firm-specific resources will be powerful, visible, and legitimate within 
their organizations.  But there are economic mechanisms behind this link as well.  
Specifically, a firm is likely to compensate executives for existing firm-specific 
resources in order to induce employees into investing in the accumulation of new 
firm-specific resources, as an incentive for managers to contribute their firm-specific 
resources in creating value for their firms (i.e., an efficiency wage), and as a means of 
guaranteeing the services rendered by the manager’s resources.  Moreover, as 
discussed below, it may not always be apparent which resources are firm-specific, 
and most resources will exhibit both generic and firm-specific characteristics.  If a 
certain executive excels at managing a particular R&D team, is the executive’s 
superior performance related to firm-specific skills that would be irrelevant outside 
the current firm, team-specific skills that can travel between firms but only if other 
team members do so as well, or generic skills that could be applied to the 
management of any R&D team?  The only way to know with certainty, for the 
manager and/or the person(s) setting the manager’s compensation, would be for the 
manager to depart the firm.  The firm may be willing to provide extra compensation 
in order to avoid that outcome.
Linking Human and Social Capital to Executive Compensation
In this section, I present formal hypotheses linking the compensation an 
executive receives to the resources that she brings to the table, including generic 
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human capital, generic social capital, firm-specific human capital, and firm-specific 
social capital.  For each class of resources, I first discuss the manner in which these 
resources create value for firms, then I explain why executives should be able to 
appropriate some or all of the value that is created.  In a subsequent section, I discuss 
the implications of the differences between generic and firm-specific resources for 
determining whether executives or shareholders will appropriate greater value.
Generic Human Capital
Generic human capital includes education, training, and accumulated 
experience that are applicable in multiple organizational contexts.  This does not 
imply that generic human capital cannot be specialized, rare, or valuable.  To the 
contrary, generic human capital may be quite specialized, but in a manner that does 
not constrain its portability beyond a single firm.  Resources that are specialized but 
not firm-specific, such as technology-, industry- or country-specific resources (e.g., 
earning an MD in cardiology, developing expertise with nanotechnology, or 
accumulating experience in a particular foreign country) are still portable, whereas 
resources that are truly firm-specific are only deployable within a single firm.
While all forms of human capital are subject to market imperfections because 
these resources are illiquid and embedded in individuals, well-functioning markets 
are most likely to exist for generic, rather than firm-specific, human capital.  At the 
extreme, “Perfectly general training would be equally useful in many firms and 
marginal products would rise by the same extent in all of them.  Consequently, wage 
rates would rise by exactly the same amount as the marginal product and the firms 
providing such training could not capture any of the return,” (Becker, 1993: 34) 
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which explains why the costs of investments in generic human capital are generally 
borne by individuals rather than their employers.  Therefore, I hypothesize that 
generic human capital will convey market power upon executives, allowing them to 
obtain higher compensation in exchange for the services rendered from their human 
capital.
Specifically, I focus on two dimensions of generic human capital: formal 
education and breadth of experience.
Formal education.  Compensation is generally closely related to the amount 
of formal education a person has received.  Empirical studies have documented the 
link between education and income across numerous industries and countries 
(Becker, 1993).  However, most of these samples were drawn from the general 
population or from lower levels of organizations.  At the upper echelons of public 
corporations, the link between formal education and compensation may be weaker.  
Even though organizational performance is more likely to be influenced by the 
capabilities of a single employee when that individual is a top manager of the firm 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), differences in the formal 
education of executives may have little relation with differences in organizational 
performance or individual compensation.  First, top managers tend to be fairly 
homogenous in terms of educational background—the vast majority have university 
degrees, and a disproportionate number were educated in a small number of elite 
schools (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 21).  Furthermore, many of the skills needed 
to be an effective manager are acquired through learning-by- doing rather than formal 
education (Mintzberg, 1973).
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Prior research provides some support for a link between education and 
executive compensation.  In a sample comprised of SBU heads, Fisher & 
Govindarajan (1992) found that compensation was positively related to the years of 
education.  In a sample consisting of multiple hierarchical levels of executives, 
Leonard (1990) found strong evidence of a link between education and compensation: 
each additional year of schooling was associated with an 11% increase in pay, and 
generic human capital had a much larger impact on compensation than did firm-
specific human capital.  Given that the present sample includes high technology 
firms, and that managers must understand complex technical issues to lead such 
firms, we expect to find a positive linear relation between formal education and 
executive compensation.
Breadth of experience across industries.  In addition to formal education, 
another important dimension of generic human capital is the extent to which an 
executive possesses broad experience that transcends a single industry.  Top 
managers with broad experience may exhibit cognitive complexity and a broader 
perspective. In particular, executives who have experience spanning multiple 
industries are likely to have faced a wider range of operating environments; learning 
how to survive and thrive in diverse environments should convey an advantage upon 
executives with broad experience.  Collective cognition tends to emerge within 
industries and creates pressure for the homogenization of cognitive schemata within a 
given industry (Spender, 1989).  To the extent that an executive has acquired 
experience in diverse industry settings, the executive should be more resilient against 
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myopic industry mindsets and should be better able to identify opportunities to 
transfer best practices and other forms of knowledge between industries.
In addition to the value-creating benefits of broad experience, executives with 
experience in multiple industries should also be more capable of capturing existing 
value.  Consider two executives, the first of which has spent 25 years in the grocery 
industry, and an equally tenured executive whose experience spans five different 
industries.  Upon deciding to seek out new employment, the first executive is likely to 
enter the market for grocery or retail executives, while the latter will be entering the 
broader managerial labor market for all industries.  The executive with the wider 
opportunity set is more likely to command greater compensation.
Hypothesis 1.  The amount of generic human capital an executive has accumulated
(measured in terms of years of education and breadth of experience across industries)
will be positively related to executive compensation.
Generic Social Capital
An executive’s generic social capital (i.e., social capital that is not firm-
specific) consists of ‘bridging’ ties to external contacts, while firm-specific social 
capital consists of ‘bonding’ ties to contacts within the firm.  In operational terms, 
generic social capital can be measured by assessing key attributes of an ego’s ties to 
alters located outside the firm (e.g., external network size, range, and strength of ties), 
while firm-specific social capital may be evaluated by examining the same attributes 
of the ego’s internal social network ties.
Of the three ways in which social capital creates value (information, 
influence, and solidarity), the information benefits of generic social capital are most 
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evident.  Boundary spanning ties help a firm gain and sustain a competitive advantage 
by helping to identify shifts in the external environment and competitive dynamics, as 
well as by gaining access to key external constituencies such as regulatory bodies, 
financial institutions, and trade associations. More directly, many external ties relate 
to a firm’s physical and knowledge supply chain, or to customers.  For instance, 
external ties may help a firm identify opportunities to enhance innovation through 
collaboration (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996).  In all cases, external social 
capital creates value for firms by providing access to information and/or influence.
Generic social capital conveys market power, and much of the value generated 
by external social capital will be directly appropriable by the executives themselves
(Blyler & Coff, 2003).  In contrast with firm-specific ties, external ties take on a 
private goods nature (Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  While external ties remain 
relational assets and are therefore unlikely to be directly tradable, the brokering 
services provided by such ties are tradable.  I focus on three attributes of external 
social capital: external network size, external network range, and the strength of 
external ties3.
External Network Size.  Just as firms with large and diverse networks are 
able to enjoy access to wider information sources and reduce dependence on any 
single contact, so will individuals (Burt, 1992).  Executives who maintain larger 
external networks are likely to have a more complete understanding of their firm’s 
external environment and will likely be quicker to learn of changes in that 
environment.  Not only can such executives create more value by helping their firms 
3 Additional attributes of social capital, such as network centrality, could also be linked to value 
appropriation.  I do not address network centrality because it cannot be measured in egocentric 
networks, as discussed below.
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navigate their environment, but they will also be better able to identify opportunities 
for individual advancement.  Since generic social capital is at least partially portable, 
they can also parlay their large external networks into a more appealing job with 
another firm.
External Network Range.  Network range refers to the diversity of social ties 
within a social network (Scott, 1991).  Although larger networks tend to exhibit 
greater range, this is not always the case.  The greater the range of an executive’s 
external network, the greater will be the diversity of information the executive can 
access.  Since most firms are subject to a wide variety of external exigencies and top 
management positions require cognitive complexity to process diverse and potentially 
contradictory information, top managers will benefit from having access to a wider 
range of social contacts.
Strength of External Ties. Ceteris paribus, the stronger an external tie, the 
more valuable the tie.  If ties are to be seen as conductors of information between 
nodes, strong ties have better conductivity than weak ties.  Strong ties are more cost 
effective than weak ties in transmitting complex information and tacit knowledge 
across organizational boundaries (Hansen, 1999), and they are more useful for 
politically sensitive tasks and occasions that require high levels of trust between 
organizations (Uzzi, 1997).  However, I acknowledge that the beneficial aspect of 
external tie strength may be dampened by the possibility that strong ties are redundant 
ties (Granovetter, 1973).  Strong ties may also be more costly to maintain (Hansen, 
2001).
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Hypothesis 2.  The amount of generic social capital an executive has accumulated
(measured in terms of external network size, external network range, strength of 
external ties, and criticality of external ties) will be positively related to executive 
compensation.
Firm-Specific Human Capital
Becker (1996: 11) summarizes the economic perspective on firm-specific 
human capital as follows:
“By definition, firm-specific knowledge is useful only in the firms 
providing it, whereas general knowledge is useful also in other firms.  
Teaching someone to operate an IBM-compatible personal computer is 
general training, whereas learning the authority structure and the 
talents of employees in a particular company is specific knowledge.  
This distinction helps explain why workers with highly specific skills 
are less likely to quit their jobs and are the last to be laid off during 
business downturns.  It also explains why most promotions are made 
from within a firm rather than through hiring—workers need time to 
learn about a firm’s structure and ‘culture’—and why better 
accounting methods would include the specific human capital of 
employees among the principal assets of most companies” (Becker, 
1996: 11).
Elsewhere, Becker (1993) further explains that although all forms of human capital 
are relatively illiquid, firm- specific human capital is perfectly so.  He concludes that 
firms have no economic reason to invest in purely generic human capital, but they 
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will rationally pay for a portion of firm-specific training costs, since employees are 
able to appropriate only a small portion of the value of firm-specific human capital.
Executives can leverage generic human capital to appropriate greater value, even 
when the generic human capital is highly specialized, such as Peteraf’s (1993) 
example of a Nobel laureate.  But when the human capital is firm-specific, the 
executive cannot rely upon market power.
Instead, firm-specific human capital conveys institutional power by enabling 
an executive to navigate the subtleties of the firm’s informal structure.  I focus on two 
dimensions of firm-specific human capital that may enable an executive to 
appropriate value: tenure and knowledge of organizational processes.
Tenure. The most common and intuitive indicator of firm-specific human 
capital is tenure.  As executives accumulate additional tenure, they acquire greater 
task knowledge (albeit with diminishing returns) and power, though the diversity of 
information sources they employ is likely to decline (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).  
At the CEO level, prior research has generally failed to identify significant linkages 
between tenure and compensation (Deckop, 1988; O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal; 
Rajagopalan and Prescott, 1990; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995).  Tenure is a fairly 
crude measure of firm-specific human capital, and it may also be viewed as an 
indicator of other constructs, such as managerial entrenchment and power (Hill & 
Phan, 1991; Barkema & Pennings, 1998).
Knowledge of Organizational Processes.  Although substantial measurement 
challenges exist, it may be more fruitful to attempt to directly measure firm-specific 
human capital, rather than utilizing convenient proxies such as tenure.  The most 
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important factor underlying the presumed link between firm-specific human capital 
and executive value appropriation is tacit knowledge of organizational processes and 
routines.  These processes and routines are widely heralded as key drivers of 
sustainable competitive advantage and even as the basis of a theory of the firm 
(Kogut & Zander, 1996).  Such advantages may be sustained in equilibrium due to the 
attendant uncertain imitability and causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).  
However, these same characteristics can inhibit the transfer of knowledge within the 
firm, thereby limiting the ability of firms to exploit complex and tacit firm-specific 
knowledge (Coff, 1997).  
Executives who are able to understand and manage organizational processes 
that elude codification will not only help their firms succeed, but will also be 
positioned to advance their own careers.  For instance, Krackhardt (1990) found that 
individuals with more accurate cognitive maps of internal social networks tend to be 
perceived as more powerful.  Through the possession of firm-specific knowledge that 
is hard to come by, such as understanding how information flows within the 
organization or how control is distributed, executives should be better able to 
appropriate greater value.  Not only will these executives be able to create more 
value, but they will be able to position themselves favorably within existing incentive 
structures and/or revise those incentive structures to suit their personal preferences.
Hypothesis 3. The amount of firm-specific human capital an executive has 
accumulated (measured in terms of tenure within the firm and knowledge of 
organizational processes) will be positively related to executive compensation.
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Firm-Specific Social Capital
There are numerous reasons to believe that firm-specific social capital is 
associated with value creation.  Many of these reasons are provided by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998), who identify three dimensions of social capital that create value for 
firms: the structural and relational dimensions, which respectively include social 
interactions and the assets embedded in those interactions, and the cognitive 
dimension of social capital, which includes shared goals, norms and values.  The 
structural dimension consists of internal ties that make it possible to combine 
knowledge within the firm to create new value.  The relational dimension serves as a 
trust-based governance system that enables transactions that could not as easily 
transpire across market-mediated transactions.  The cognitive dimension provides a 
common language for the effective transfer of information within the firm.
Although the above factors imply that internal social ties will enable value 
creation, firm-specific social capital is most frequently thought of as a public good
and may not generate appropriable value for individuals.  Citing other authors (Asefa 
& Huang, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993), Leanna and Van Buren (1999: 
540) state that “the ‘payoff’ from individuals’ acts to enhance social capital directly 
accrues to the social unit as a whole and only indirectly back to the individual.”  How, 
then, might it be possible that executives may directly appropriate value from firm-
specific social capital?
From an economic perspective, it is easy to see that firm- specific social 
capital will not convey market power and therefore the value created by firm-specific 
social capital should be retained by the firm rather than appropriated by individual 
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executives.  From a social and political perspective, it may also appear at first that 
value from firm-specific social capital will not be appropriated by individuals because 
instrumental actions taken by executives to leverage value from their internal 
networks are not likely to be perceived well within the organization.  It is one thing 
for an executive to demand higher compensation because the executive maintains 
exclusive ties to potential clients or regulatory bodies.  Demanding higher 
compensation because one has strong ties to internal stakeholders is less justifiable.
In limited circumstances, such as intra-TMT ties discussed below, individuals 
may overtly exercise institutional power to capture value from firm-specific social 
capital.  More commonly, however, executives are more likely to appropriate value 
from firm-specific social capital in a covert manner, much in the same manner as 
firm-specific human capital.  Internal social networks may be deployed to 
opportunistically control information flows, not only overcoming existing 
information asymmetries but also creating new ones.  Executives that have 
accumulated superior firm-specific social capital possess a superior understanding of 
the dynamics within an organization, and are going to be more capable of steering 
those dynamics in their favor.  Even if their internal networks are structurally 
redundant, executives may exploit their central positions and strong ties to extract 
greater value.
The cognitive dimension of social capital may inhibit both overt and covert 
efforts to capture value.  To the extent that an executive possesses greater firm-
specific social capital, she is likely to subscribe to a greater proportion of the shared 
values, goals and norms of reciprocity within the firm.  The executive is less likely to 
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deploy her social capital in an instrumental and opportunistic fashion.  However, she 
is also less likely to need to do so in order to capture value.  The executive who 
possesses greater firm-specific capital will exhibit greater legitimacy, visibility and 
status within the firm.  
To further explore the relation between internal social networks and value 
appropriation, I focus on five dimensions of internal social capital: the strength of 
intra-TMT ties, internal network size, internal network strength, the criticality of 
internal ties, and the criticality of external ties.4
Strength of Intra-TMT Ties.  That maintaining strong ties within the top 
management team should help an executive appropriate value would be of little 
surprise to critics of social capital theory.  These critics (e.g., Locke, 1999) have 
argued that social capital constitutes little more than an ‘old boys’ network.  A top 
management team comprised of strong ties among all members may act as a rent-
seeking cabal that seeks to maximize value appropriation at the expense of value 
creation and at the expense of shareholders.  Within such a system, individual 
executives may increase their pay by consolidating their role within the cabal.
There are also less nefarious reasons to believe executives who maintain 
strong ties within the top management team will receive greater compensation. 
Strong ties are more effective for the transfer of sensitive, complex, and/or critical 
information (Krackhardt, 1992; Hansen, 1999).  It may simply be in the firm’s best 
4 These appear to be the most relevant properties of internal social capital.  Intra-TMT network size 
would be irrelevant, since all TMT members are tied to each other by definition.  Similarly, internal 
network range is not useful, since most executives maintain at least one tie in all internal 
constituencies.
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interest to allocate power and compensation to those executives who are best able to 
serve as conduits for the flow of information within the top management team.
Internal Network Size. An important function played by top management 
teams is to identify and mobilize knowledge that is being created at lower levels of 
the firm.  Not all executives will have sufficient access to such knowledge.  
Executives who maintain social ties with a larger set of internal stakeholders will be 
better positioned to identify, transfer, and combine knowledge that resides at lower 
levels of the organization.  Even if these ties are structurally redundant, an executive 
should be able to exploit her hierarchical position to reap benefits from the ties.  
Executives are not necessarily expected to create new knowledge, but rather to 
identify opportunities to deploy knowledge that is being created or accumulated at 
lower levels of the organization.
Strength of Internal Ties. As in the case of external social ties, strong 
internal ties may be more effective conduits of certain types of information than will 
weak internal ties.  Internal ties are more likely to be structurally redundant than will 
bridging ties and will not convey market power.  Yet executives who maintain strong 
internal ties can depend on their internal contacts to help them consolidate their own 
personal power within the organization.  For instance, Burt and Ronchi (1990) recant 
the story of a manager who was fired as a cost-cutting measure.  Unbeknownst to the 
top management team, the manager they fired had personally recruited 106 people to 
the firm.  Upon his dismissal, these strong ties mobilized in a hostile fashion against 
the management.  In an even more transformational case, Frank Quattrone 
consolidated his personal power by maintaining strong ties to his team of more than 
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100 analysts; he and his team appropriated the lion’s share of the profits they 
generated and transferred firms as a team to seek out an even more favorable 
arrangement (Chacar & Coff, 2000).
Criticality of Internal Ties.  Whereas tie strength relates to the conductivity 
of social ties, criticality relates to whether the node at the other end (i.e., the alter) is a 
source of valuable information or goodwill.  Social ties that are strong and numerous 
are likely to have little bearing on an individual’s compensation unless the ties are 
also valuable for the executive’s job.  Individual executives benefit personally from 
being uniquely positioned to handle critical contingencies (Hickson et al, 1971).  The 
criticality of internal ties refers to the extent to which an executive’s ties outside the 
TMT but within the firm are of great importance to the firm.
Criticality of External Ties.  As in the case of internal ties, executive 
compensation is likely to be dependent on not only the quantity and strength of 
external ties, but also on the extent to which the ties are useful for helping manage 
critical contingencies. One way an executive may assume such a role is to develop 
social ties with key external parties, since strategic contingencies often arise from an 
organization’s dependence on external parties for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Although external ties are generally thought of as a generic form of social 
capital, the extent to which these generic resources are critical to the firm’s operations 
is itself a firm-specific characteristic.  For this reason, I have classified the criticality 
of internal ties as a form of firm-specific social capital.
Hypothesis 4.  The amount of firm-specific social capital an executive has 
accumulated (measured in terms of intra-TMT tie strength, internal network size,
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strength of internal ties, criticality of internal ties and criticality of external ties) will 
be positively related to executive compensation.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
In this chapter, I review the research methods employed in this dissertation.
Sample and Research Procedures
The data analyzed for this dissertation were collected as part of a larger 
project undertaken by three doctoral students and two professors at the University of 
Maryland.  Data collection efforts included the administration of survey instruments 
completed by executives during the second half of 1999, from which most key 
explanatory variables were obtained.  The dependent variable, executive 
compensation, as well as control and moderator variables were obtained from 
subsequent corporate SEC filings.  The procedure followed for sampling and data 
collection is outlined below.
Sample
Our sample of 71 executives from 36 firms was drawn from the population of 
publicly-traded firms in technology-intensive industries located in the US Mid-
Atlantic region.  The sample is restricted to publicly-traded firms because only these 
firms are required to report executive compensation data to the SEC5.  We decided to 
focus on firms in three broad technology-intensive industries (information and 
communication technology, biotechnology/biomedical, and engineering) in order to 
minimize intra-sample variance due to industry differences.  Technology-intensive 
industries were selected because prior research has demonstrated the important role 
5 As part of the same data collection effort, we collected data from a limited number of private firms as 
well.  However, since compensation data are not available for the private firms, they have been entirely 
excluded from the present analysis.
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executive human capital and social capital play in creating value in technology-
intensive industries, which are generally characterized by high managerial discretion
(Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995).  The sample was geographically constrained to 
one region of the United States to facilitate data collection.
Once the target population was identified, we contacted the CEO of each firm 
to request participation.  42 of the 110 public firms agreed to participate and returned 
surveys, resulting in a participation rate of 38%.  Non-responding firms cited a 
variety of reasons for not participating, among which the most common reason was 
the existence of an explicit corporate policy against participation in research studies.  
In order to test for response bias, we compared participating and non-participating 
firms by annual revenue, net income, and number of employees.  On average, 
responding firms had slightly larger revenue and greater net income but fewer 
employees; none of these differences were statistically significant at p < .10, 
however.
Each CEO was asked to identify the set of managers who are most typically 
involved in determining the overall strategic direction of the firm, which is a common 
method for defining top management teams (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), and 
signed a letter of support requesting that top management team members complete a 
survey6.  Of the 261 top management team members identified by participating CEOs 
(an average of 6.2 per firm), 145 (56%) returned surveys, 9 of which were partially 
incomplete and therefore unusable.  Although completed surveys were received from
136 executives from 42 firms (i.e., 52% of the executives of participating firms), 
6 Distinct survey instruments were also distributed to corporate human resource executives and to core 
knowledge workers at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy.  However, the present study is centered 
on data obtained from the top management teams.
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compensation data were only available for those executives who were listed in the 
companies’ SEC filings.  The response rate that compares favorably with other 
surveys of top managers of publicly-traded firms.  The principal title held by 
executives in the sample includes CEO (15 observations), President and/or COO (10), 
Executive Vice President (10), CFO (11), Senior Vice President (33), Vice President 
(39), and other (18, including CTO, HR director, legal counsel, controller, and SBU 
manager).
In proxy statements filed annually with the SEC, firms are required to report 
three years of compensation data for ‘named’ executives, which include the CEO and 
the four most highly paid executives whose salary and bonus exceeds $100,000.  
Therefore, focusing exclusively on the named executives may introduce bias and may 
artificially constrain intra-TMT variance in executive compensation. Unfortunately, 
the compensation data of non-named executives cannot be known with certainty.  
Instead, for any given non- named executive, compensation must be lower than that 
received by the lowest-paid named executive (or lower than $100,000 if fewer than 
five named executives are listed7).  Case-wide deletion of observations for non-named 
executives is a more conservative approach, and I have chosen to adopt this approach 
for the main results, in spite of the lower sample size (i.e., 71 executives from 36 
firms).  
Data Collection
The dependent variable in my analysis, executive compensation, is derived 
from SEC filings.  Publicly-traded corporations are required to disclose compensation 
7 Three of the firms in our sample reported fewer than five ‘named’ executives.
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data for named executives in proxy statements, form DEF-14, filed with the SEC 
prior to each annual meeting of shareholders.  Social capital and human capital 
measures were collected during the second half of 1999.  In order to match 
compensation data to the same period, I utilized proxy statements filed during the 
calendar year 2000, which corresponds to firms with fiscal years ending between the 
fourth quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2000.  In a small number of cases, 
compensation data were not available for that time period.  This generally occurred 
for firms that ceased to report proxy statements during 2000, due to having been 
acquired by another firm or being de-listed from the stock exchange.  In these cases, I 
utilized compensation data for the previous year.  In unreported models, I used an 
alternative method of assessing compensation, based on average compensation for a 
three-year period starting with the year prior to data collection.  Three-year average 
compensation correlated at 0.92 with one-year compensation, and both measures 
produced virtually identical results.
Most independent variables of interest (i.e., measures of human capital and 
social capital) were obtained through a survey completed by each participating 
executive.  A copy of the survey is included in the appendix of this dissertation.  The 
survey instrument completed by each executive assessed the executives’ ego-centered 
social networks by prompting executives for information regarding social ties with 
fourteen categories of alters, including ties with other top management team 
members, nine categories of external contacts, and four categories of internal 
contacts.  When possible, the accuracy of the self-reported data was corroborated 
49
using archival sources.  For instance, annual reports and company web sites were 
used to confirm self-reported information concerning education and prior experience.
Additional variables were obtained from archival sources.  Corporate financial 
data, market performance, and measures of corporate governance were obtained from 
the Compustat database and from SEC filings including annual reports and proxy 
statements.  I also utilized information from the websites of companies in the sample 
as an additional source of data on executive human capital and directors.
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variable: Executive Compensation
We focus on publicly disclosed executive compensation (i.e., salary, bonus, 
options, restricted stock, and other forms of compensation) as the primary observable 
mechanism through which executives appropriate value.  Compensation data were 
obtained from proxy statements filed with the SEC.  I focused on total compensation 
in order to include as many forms of value appropriation as possible and because 
variable pay such as bonuses and stock options account for a large portion of total 
compensation for executives of publicly traded firms, and I did not hypothesize 
different effects for different forms of compensation.  As is common in executive 
compensation research (e.g., Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993), I valued stock 
options at 25% of the exercise price for our main models, though I also include a 
model with stock options valued at 50% of the exercise price8.  For the sample of 71 
8 While variations of the Black-Scholes formula are also commonly used, particularly in studies using 
the ExecuComp database, Black-Scholes is arguably inappropriate for the valuation of executive stock 
options.  In spite of its computational rigor, this approach requires the unreasonable assumption that an 
external market for options exists or that executives may diversify their option-related risk, and more 
importantly, there is little evidence that executives seek to maximize the Black-Scholes value of their 
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executives and with options valued at 25% of the exercise price, the average total 
compensation received was $622,760, which includes $170,915 in salary, $92,929 in 
bonus, $197,143 in stock options, and $37,266 in other forms of compensation.  
Considering that the average top management team of sampled firms included 6.45
individuals, the total compensation received by top managers for an average firm 
($4.02 million) is equivalent to approximately 6% of average EBIT and 16.8% of net 
income, suggesting that top managers in the sampled firms appropriate a significant 
portion of the value created within their firms.
Independent Variables: Generic Human Capital
Human capital includes the knowledge an individual has accumulated through 
formal education, training, and experience.
Education.  I measure formal education as a count measure of the number of 
years of post-secondary education completed by each executive (Fisher & 
Govindarajan, 1992; Leonard, 1990).  On average, executives in the sample 
completed just over 6 years of post-secondary education.
Breadth of Experience.  I measure the extent to which an executive’s prior 
experience is applicable in a diverse range of industry settings by including a count 
measure of the number of industries in which each executive has been employed.  
This measure of breadth of experience ranges from 1 to 6 industries for the sampled 
executives.
options, rather than relying on simple heuristics such as the exercise price and number of shares 
(Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Murphy, 1985).  Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) 
show that simpler procedures for valuing options, such as the one used in this paper, produce 
valuations similar to the Black-Scholes value.  Similarly, Lewellen, Park and Ro (1995) found that 
Black-Scholes options valuations for 215 firms averaged 37.2% of the exercise price multiplied by the 
number of shares, and approximately 60% of the values fell between 25% and 50% of the exercise 
price.
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Independent Variables: Generic Social Capital
Each measure of social capital employed in this study was derived from 
surveys in which executives were prompted to describe their ego-centered social 
networks according to the type of contact.  In operational terms, I defined generic 
social capital as the characteristics of all social ties with external contacts and firm-
specific social capital as the characteristics of all social ties with internal contacts.  
For generic social capital, executives were asked to report the characteristics of social 
ties to nine categories of external alters, including financial institutions, suppliers, 
customers, competitors, alliance partners, government agencies, trade associations, 
external board members, and others.  Consistent with a modified position-generator
approach (Lin & Dumin, 1986), executives were asked to identify the number of 
contacts within each category, then to assess the nature of the ties within each 
category.  From this information, I created three variables to represent attributes of 
the sampled executives’ generic (i.e., external) social networks: external network size, 
range of external ties, and strength of external ties.  
External Network Size.  One indicator of the extensiveness of an executive’s 
boundary-spanning social network is external network size.  Operationally, external 
network size is defined as the sum of an executive’s contacts across all nine 
categories of external ties.  Count measures of social ties are commonly used in 
network research to capture the size dimension of social capital (Scott, 1991; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Range of External Ties.  Measures of network range are often employed to 
complement measures of network size.  Both measures serve as a reflection of the 
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extensiveness of an egocentric network, but network range introduces new 
information concerning the diversity of an individual’s social ties.  Inclusion of 
network range is particularly important if and when ties within a given group (i.e., 
financial institutions) can be viewed as structurally equivalent.  Diverse ties to alters 
who are not structurally equivalent may be valuable to both the executives themselves 
and their firms by creating opportunities to bridge structural holes (Burt, 1992).  As is 
conventional in network studies following position-generator procedures (e.g., 
Walker, Wasserman, & Wellman, 1993), the range of external ties is measured in this 
study by the number of external categories in which an executive maintains social 
ties.  Values of the variable may therefore vary between 0 and 9.  Not surprisingly, 
the range of external ties is positively correlated with external network size (r = .39), 
but the correlation is not high enough to create problems of multicollinearity.
Strength of External Ties.  Conceptually, tie strength consists of three 
dimensions: frequency of interaction, duration of the relationship, and emotional 
intensity of the bond (Granovetter, 1973). Empirically, most published research in 
management fields has focused on the first two dimensions and omitted emotional 
intensity (Krackhardt, 1992), even though research in sociology has suggested that 
emotional intensity or closeness is the best single measure of tie strength (Marsden & 
Campbell, 1984).  When emotional intensity has been included, this has generally 
taken the form of a dichotomous measure of whether or not the relationship is 
considered a friendship, as opposed to a relationship that entails less emotional 
intensity (e.g., Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994).
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I operationalized the strength of external ties as a linear combination of the 
standardized scores for the three dimensions of tie strength.  Frequency of interaction 
is measured in terms of the average number of times per month that the executive 
interacts with the average alter.  Duration of ties is represented by the mean length of 
time the executive reports to have known the average contact within each category.  
Rather than forcing a dichotomous characterization of whether or not a contact is a 
friend, emotional intensity was measured directly through the question “How close is 
your relationship with these contacts on average?”  Responses could vary on a Likert-
type response scale from 1 = ‘not at all close’ to 5 = ‘extremely close’, and the overall 
measure of emotional intensity for each executive was obtained by taking the average 
score across all categories of external ties.
Independent Variables: Firm-Specific Human Capital
I focus on experience and knowledge as indicators of firm-specific human 
capital.
Tenure in Firm.  An executive with a longer tenure in the firm is likely to 
have acquired a greater amount of firm-specific tacit and explicit knowledge.  I
include a measure of the number of years each executive has spent at her current 
organization as a proxy for firm-specific human capital.  However, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, prior research linking tenure to compensation has produced mixed 
results, which may be partially due to the weakness of tenure as a proxy for firm-
specific human capital.
Knowledge of Organizational Processes.  Although human capital is most 
often measured in terms of years and credentials, the amount of time an individual 
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has spent at an activity and the credentials one has to show for it are imperfect 
measure of accumulated tacit and explicit knowledge.  Other researchers have 
acknowledged a need for more reasonable proxies for the quality of managerial skills, 
not just the types of skills (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Bailey & Helfat, 2003).  In 
order to obtain a more direct measure of firm-specific human capital, I created a 
variable which reflects the extent to which a given executive understands complex 
organizational processes within his or her firm.  Each executive completed a 15-item 
survey regarding the knowledge creation capability of their firm, which included 
dimensions of access to knowledge, combination capability, and anticipated value, 
following Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998).  For each firm, an average score was 
obtained on each item, and individual responses were compared to the average to 
construct an overall measure of an individual executive’s concordance with the 
perceptions of other TMT members.  This measure was computed as the Euclidean 
distance between the focal executive’s responses and the average response for the 
executive’s firm.  Values were then subtracted from zero so that higher values signify 
greater knowledge of organizational processes.  The validity of this measure was 
supported by analyzing differences between executives according to structural 
position.  In an unreported regression, I found that inside directors scored 
significantly higher than executives who do not sit on their firms’ boards.  Similarly, I
observed anticipated differences between executives depending on the titles they 
hold; Presidents/COOs and CEOs demonstrated the greatest understanding of their 
organizations’ knowledge creation capability, while CFOs scored lower on average 
than all other top management team members.  These findings are consistent with 
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expectations of the roles played by different executives, particularly that COOs are 
likely to possess greater amounts of firm-specific knowledge while CFOs are likely to 
possess less (Cannella and Hambrick, 2003).
Independent Variables: Firm-Specific Social Capital
Firm-specific social capital was assessed in a similar fashion to generic social
capital, with minor differences.  First, firm-specific ties can be broken down between 
ties within the upper echelon of the firm (i.e., intra-TMT ties), and ties to other parts 
of the organization.  Measures such as network size and range are irrelevant for intra-
TMT ties, since TMTs are fully connected networks.  Therefore, I captured three 
dimensions of firm-specific human capital: intra-TMT tie strength, internal network 
size, and strength of internal (i.e., within the firm but non-TMT) ties.
Intra-TMT Tie Strength.  I assessed the average strength of intra-TMT ties 
by aggregating the standardized averages for duration, frequency, and closeness of 
ties with other members of the firm’s top management team.  
Internal Network Size.  Internal network size is a count measure of the 
number of social ties an executive maintains within the organization but excluding the 
TMT.  Executives were prompted to enumerate ties to four internal categories: 
operations/manufacturing, sales/marketing, research and development, and other.  
Strength of Internal Ties.  For the same four categories of internal ties, a 
measure of average tie strength was created by aggregating the standardized averages 
for duration, frequency, and closeness of internal ties.
Criticality of Internal Ties.  Whereas the measure of tie strength attempts to 
capture the connectivity of the tie, criticality assesses the relevance of the information 
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and goodwill that may be conveyed by the nodes (i.e., the alters with whom an 
executive is connected).  The most critical ties are those that are of importance or 
value to the firm.  Accordingly, each executive was asked to assess the criticality of 
ties maintained in each of the four internal categories.
Criticality of External Ties.  As in the case of the criticality of external ties, 
the criticality of internal ties was computed as the weighted average of an executive’s 
assessment of the degree to which his/her ties across each of the nine external 
categories, by responding to the following question: “How important are they (the ties 
within a given category) for your firm’s goals?”  Answers were allowed to range from 
1 (not important) to 5 (critical).  In order to obtain a single measure of the criticality 
of each executive’s external ties, I calculated a weighted average of the criticality of 
ties across the nine categories, since executives may maintain many ties in some 
categories and few ties in others.
Control Variables
Control variables include items measured at the level of the individual 
(ownership in the firm, directorship status), firm (corporate governance, TMT size, 
firm size, firm performance) and industry (industry membership).
Ownership.  I account for each executive’s equity stake in the firm by a 
measure of the percentage of stock held by the executive.  Prior research has shown 
that ownership may influence the level of compensation and/or pay mix, though it is 
unclear whether high ownership levels indicate an alignment of managerial and 
shareholder interests (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) or increased managerial power 
relative to the board (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Barkema & Pennings, 1998).
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Directorship.  I control for executives’ structural position in their firms 
through the use of a dummy variable indicating whether or not the executive sits on 
the company’s board of directors.  Inside directors are likely to have greater influence 
and status within the organization than will other executives (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996), and are therefore likely to receive greater compensation.  Because 
an executive’s network position is likely to be closely related to her structural 
position, I was cautious to avoid over-controlling for structural position.  Therefore, I
exclude this variable from the main models reported, but I also report a model 
including this variable.  26 of the 136 executives in the sample were inside directors.
Firm size.  In past studies, organizational size has generally been the strongest 
predictor of executive compensation (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  I
control for differences in size by including the natural logarithm of annual revenue.
Firm performance.  As indicated by executive compensation research 
steeped in agency theory, executive pay is or should be linked to indicators of firm 
performance.  Although empirical research has shown that the link between firm 
performance and executive pay is much weaker than agency theory would seem to 
indicate (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), I included measures for three distinct dimensions 
of firm performance.  I include a measure of two-year total stock returns for market 
performance.  I account for differences in profitability by including ROE.  Revenue 
growth, which is particularly important as a measure of performance for young firms 
and for firms in high technology sectors, is measured as two-year sales growth, 
ending in the year in which network and compensation data were collected.
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Corporate governance.  Executives of firms with weaker governance 
structures should be able to appropriate a larger amount of value at the expense of 
shareholders.  Researchers and practitioners often disagree concerning what 
constitutes good governance.  For instance, standards in the United States favor 
boards with a large proportion of outside directors to promote independence, whereas 
European standards favor boards with a larger proportion of inside directors, who are 
likely to possess better information upon which to base governance decisions.  One 
factor that has been often identified as shifting power toward executives and away 
from shareholders is the predominance of directors that were nominated to the board 
by the sitting CEO.  Following prior research (Peck and Simon, 1998; Pollock, 
Fischer, and Wade, 2002; Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1998), I include a measure of the percentage of directors that were nominated 
during the current CEO’s tenure.  Higher values indicate weaker external oversight
and greater CEO influence over the board of directors.
TMT size.  The information processing demands placed upon executives in 
large top management teams may be less severe than for executives in smaller TMTs, 
and managerial power is likely to be more concentrated in small TMTs.  I include a 
count measure of the number of executives in each firm’s TMT to control for the 
possibility that larger TMTs may include executives with lower compensation.
Industry dummy variables.  In case there are systematic differences between 
the three technology-intensive industries represented in our sample, I include 
indicator variables for the engineering industry and information and communication 
technology.  The omitted group is biomedical/biotechnology.
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Data Analysis
In this section, I first explain how I accommodated the multi-level nature of 
the data and theory.  Then I discuss the statistical methods employed and compare 
them to alternative methods.
Level of Analysis
The issue of level of analysis is rarely straightforward, though it is often 
depicted as such.  Research questions related to value appropriation, in particular, 
introduce complex theoretical and empirical issues related to the level of analysis.
Firms may be depicted as competing at one level to appropriate value that exists at a 
higher level (e.g., industry, organizational field, or population), then internal 
stakeholders compete at a lower level to appropriate the value that has been 
appropriated by the ‘firm’.  These internal stakeholders, in turn, may be analyzed at 
the individual level of analysis, as I do here, or they may be analyzed at the group 
level, such as by focusing on the top management team, unions, or shareholders.
Thus there are at least four potential levels of analysis: the competitive arena 
(industry, organizational field, population, or strategic group), the firm, internal 
stakeholder groups (top management team, unions, shareholders), or individual 
internal stakeholders (top managers, employees, individual owners).
In the empirical portion of this dissertation, I focus on the ability of top 
managers to appropriate value from individual- level resources that they control.  The 
main analytical models are single level models, whereby individual-level 
compensation is related to individual-level human capital and social capital.  I have 
chosen the individual as the level of analysis rather than the top management team so 
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as to avoid having to assume an equitable distribution of value among top managers. 
Prior research into pay dispersion within top management teams has indicated 
important variance between firms in the distribution of value within TMTs 
(Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001).  Firm-level factors act merely as control or 
nuisance variables in the main model.
Statistical Method: Random Effects Regression
My choice of analytical method for the statistical analysis of the data was 
primarily motivated by levels of analysis concerns.  First, the sample consists of 134 
executives nested within 42 firms; any statistical method utilized must account for the 
lack of independence between observations within the same firm.  Similarly, both the 
data and the theory span multiple levels of analysis.  Accordingly, the analytical 
method must be appropriate for analyzing both an individual-level model with firm-
level control variables as well as a cross-level moderator model.
I have chosen to utilize random effects models for the statistical analysis.  
Random effects models, which are also referred to as random effects generalized least 
squares (GLS), are commonly utilized within economics and increasingly within 
strategy for the analysis of panel data such as cross-sectional time-series (e.g., a panel 
of firms observed at multiple points in time).  Random effects regression is likewise 
appropriate for analyzing nested data, such as observations of individuals nested 
within firms, and is commonly employed within sociology for this purpose (Mason, 
2001).
In a random effects model of individuals nested in firms, the intercept term in 
the regression equation is allowed to vary randomly between groups (i.e., firms in this 
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case) but is not estimated for each group.  The coefficients and intercept that are 
estimated represent expected values (means) of the parameters being estimated, 
which assumes that the sample is drawn from a larger population and that the 
researcher desires to draw conclusions regarding the population rather than just those 
entities that are directly sampled.  Unlike fixed effects models, random effects 
regression permits the inclusion of variables that do not vary within groups (i.e., in 
this case, firm-level variables such as size and performance).  However, by adopting a 
random effects model, one not only has the freedom but the obligation to include 
relevant group-level variables, since random effects regression requires the 
assumption that group effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors.  The validity 
of this assumption of orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors may be 
tested via a Hausman test, which evaluates whether the random effects estimator is 
consistent by assessing whether the estimated coefficients vary significantly from 
those estimated in a fixed effects model, which is consistent but inefficient (Greene, 
2000: 576).
For each random effects model reported in this dissertation, a Hausman 
specification test was performed and indicated that the assumptions upon which the 
random effects models are based are tenable.  In other words, the firm effects and the 
explanatory variables were found to be orthogonal, implying that both random effects 
and fixed effects estimators are consistent, and the random effects estimators are 
efficient.  These results support the adoption of random effects modeling.
To provide further support for the choice of analytical method, I briefly 
review alternative methods that could have been used.
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Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) with Robust Clustering.  Standard OLS 
regression without clustering has been employed in prior compensation studies with 
hierarchical data (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992; 
Meyerson, 1994), but it is inappropriate when more than one observation per firm 
exists because OLS relies heavily upon the assumption of independence of 
observations. The strong (and unrealistic) assumption of independence of 
observations within a given firm may be relaxed by employing OLS regression with
robust clustering.  Using this procedure, the regression coefficients are identical to 
those produced by OLS, but the standard errors have been adjusted to account for the 
lack of independence.  While this represents an improvement over standard OLS, the 
regression results may still only be correctly interpreted narrowly, and random effects 
specifications are to be preferred if the assumptions upon which random effects 
models rely are tenable (Stata, 2003).  In certain cases, clustering may serve as an 
adequate method for handling contextual influences that are strictly nuisance 
variables, but this method is inadequate for handling contextual influences that are of 
theoretic interest (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).
Fixed Effects Regression. Computationally, fixed effects regression is 
equivalent to standard OLS regression with the additional inclusion of dummy 
variables for each group or context (in this case, the group is the firm).  The primary 
difference between random effects and fixed effects models is the manner in which 
group-level effects are allowed to be estimated.  In fixed effects models, the slope is 
fixed across all groups, and the constant term is allowed to vary but assumes a fixed 
value for each group.  In other words, for data of individuals nested in firms, a fixed 
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effects model estimates a fixed slope across all firms, and all differences across firms 
is accounted for by differences in the firm-level constant terms that are fixed values, 
rather than random values perceived as drawn from a wider population.  In terms of 
the present study, a fixed effects model would assume that firm membership may 
alter an executive’s compensation but may not alter the relation between the 
executive’s resources and compensation.  The fixed effects specification is most 
relevant for drawing conclusions regarding a specific sample, and is less appropriate 
for drawing out-of-sample conclusions (Greene, 2000).  Operationally, unobservable 
firm effects are controlled for indirectly in the fixed effects models (i.e., via the 
inclusion of firm dummy variables), but observable firm-level factors cannot be 
included due to the lack of intra-firm variation.
For these reasons, I have chosen to employ random effects regression over 
fixed effects regression.  However, since fixed effects models provide a different way 
of looking at firm effects in the data, and since fixed effects regression has been 
employed in at least two prior studies of nested executive compensation data 
(Leonard, 1990; Carpenter & Wade, 2002), I present the results of fixed effects 
models as a supplement to the main models.
Hierarchical Linear Modeling.  HLM is commonly employed for modeling 
multilevel analysis, such as students nested within classrooms, employees nested 
within firms, or residents nested within neighborhoods (Hofmann, 1997; Hox, 2002).  
HLM allows the researcher to empirically determine the appropriate level of analysis 
when theory is ambiguous.  HLM is also appropriate for analyzing cross-level 
moderator models, such as in this study.  This technique has been successfully 
64
employed to study compensation by Ang, Slaughter, and Ng (2002), who tested a 
cross-level moderator model of compensation for 1,576 IT staff in 39 firms.  It would 
appear, therefore, that HLM is an appropriate tool for analyzing a broad range of 
issues related to top management teams, including compensation.  However, HLM 
models that explicitly model regression slopes for each group require an adequate 
number of observations per group.  Given that top management teams tend to be 
comprised of 4 to 6 individuals (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996), HLM is not well-suited to studying top management teams unless a 
very large number of teams have been sampled.  The random effects approach 
employed for this dissertation may be viewed as a special case of HLM, i.e., one in 
which coefficients are not explicitly estimated for each group.
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Chapter 5: Results
Table 1 consists of a correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
regression models.  However, due to the nested nature of the data, the simple 
correlations are of limited interpretive value, particularly in the case of the firm-level 
control variables, in which intra-firm variance is zero by definition (e.g., firm size).  
That said, the high correlation between firm size and compensation provides further 
justification for using either random effects or fixed effects regression and for the 
inclusion of these variables in the random effects models.  Most correlations between 
independent variables used in the same regression are low; only five exceeded r = 
0.30.  These five include the correlations between external network size and external 
network range (r = 0.39); firm tenure and the strength of intra-TMT ties (r = 0.35); 
the strength of intra-TMT ties and the strength of internal ties below the TMT level (r 
= 0.33); the strength of intra-TMT ties and TMT size (r = - 0.41); and the strength of 
internal ties and the criticality of internal ties (r = 0.71).  Because the last of these is 
quite high, I ran models in which only one of the two variables was included so as to 
avoid problems of multicollinearity.  In a later section, I discuss how that influenced 
the results.
In Table 2, I present a correlation matrix for variable values that have been 
mean-centered according to the mean value for all observations within a given firm.  
This allows one to view relations between the relative values of the different variables 
and produces estimates that are closer to the results of the random effects regression 
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shown below.  Firm-level control variables are omitted from this table due to the lack 
of intra-firm variation.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix
Variable Mean StdDev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 ln(total pay), options-25% 12.8 0.92 1.00
2 ln(total pay), options-50% 13 1.03 .99 1.00
3 education, years 6.23 2.32 .40 .40 1.00
4 breadth of experience, # industries 2.32 1.26 -.05 -.07 -.16 1.00
5 external network size (# direct ties) 110 185 .13 .10 .00 -.09 1.00
6 external network range (categories) 4.7 1.84 .20 .18 .08 -.15 .39 1.00
7 strength of external ties 0 1.86 .18 .21 .21 -.18 .05 .16 1.00
8 criticality of external ties 3.55 1.03 .18 .19 .07 -.12 .08 -.05 .29 1.00
9 tenure in firm, years 9.24 8.27 .05 .03 .00 -.11 .11 .05 .19 .17 1.00
10 knowledge of org. Processes 25.8 7.09 .31 .30 .24 -.26 .05 .04 .12 .07 .04 1.00
11 strength of intra-TMT ties 0.45 2.3 -.12 -.12 .00 -.04 .06 .12 .18 .22 .35 -.09 1.00
12 internal network size (# direct ties) 35.3 49.5 .34 .35 .09 -.08 .27 .27 .00 .07 .10 .05 .08 1.00
13 strength of internal ties -0.16 2.24 -.05 -.04 -.01 -.03 -.19 .06 -.02 .28 .11 -.09 .33 .14 1.00
14 criticality of internal ties 3.89 1.45 .13 .14 .08 .03 -.20 .07 -.07 .17 -.02 -.01 .05 .27 .71 1.00
15 ownership (% of stock held by exec) 1.52 2.83 -.13 -.14 .09 -.02 .24 .23 .07 .01 .15 -.09 .26 -.04 -.02 -.02 1.00
16 board member indicator (1=director) 1.32 0.47 .14 .09 .12 .02 .14 .18 .02 .04 .22 .11 .22 .00 .00 -.04 .52 1.00
17 size, ln(revenue) 4.72 1.89 .77 .78 .22 -.03 .07 .08 .16 -.05 .12 .22 -.26 .25 -.14 -.07 -.25 -.14 1.00
18 performance, 2-year stock returns 74.5 290 .21 .18 -.05 .13 .12 -.03 -.02 .01 -.01 .12 -.17 -.01 -.04 .01 -.07 -.07 .03 1.00
19 profitability, ROE -23.5 233 .14 .14 .06 .05 .03 .07 .08 -.01 .16 .08 -.08 .04 -.07 -.11 .01 .10 .28 .02 1.00
20 growth, 2-year sales growth 19.2 107 -.10 -.11 .00 -.05 -.06 .00 .19 .02 -.15 -.05 -.15 -.10 -.10 -.18 -.06 -.07 -.07 -.06 -.10 1.00
21 governance; board named by CEO 0.55 0.36 .24 .25 .13 -.04 .05 -.01 -.11 .05 .03 -.03 .17 .14 .18 .17 .07 -.03 .10 -.18 -.15 -.32 1.00
22 TMT size 6.45 2.32 .06 .05 -.13 .20 .22 -.05 -.10 -.22 .01 -.17 -.41 .01 -.29 -.17 -.14 -.20 .46 .22 .11 .07 -.17
n = 71; correlations of r = 0.20, 0.23, and 0.29 are significant at p ≤ 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.  Significant correlations are reported in bold.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Firm Mean-Centered Data
Variable Mean StdDev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 ln(total pay), options-25% 0 0.30 1.00
2 education, years 0 1.59 0.14 1.00
3 breadth of experience, # industries 0 0.96 0.26 0.11 1.00
4 external network size (# direct ties) 0 128.15 0.50 0.02 -0.16 1.00
5 external network range (categories) 0 1.49 0.43 0.10 -0.03 0.52 1.00
6 strength of external ties 0 1.63 0.07 0.08 -0.10 0.32 0.23 1.00
7 criticality of external ties 0 0.91 0.19 -0.06 -0.13 0.16 -0.01 0.11 1.00
8 tenure in firm, years 0 5.70 0.01 -0.25 -0.06 0.15 0.04 0.20 0.11 1.00
9 knowledge of org. Processes 0 3.19 0.06 0.22 -0.17 0.16 0.15 0.04 -0.22 -0.09 1.00
10 strength of intra-TMT ties 0 1.20 0.35 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.36 0.00 1.00
11 internal network size (# direct ties) 0 33.93 0.28 -0.13 -0.09 0.27 0.30 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.06 1.00
12 strength of internal ties 0 1.74 -0.18 0.11 -0.17 -0.30 -0.03 -0.05 0.37 0.04 -0.21 0.06 0.13 1.00
13 criticality of internal ties 0 1.30 -0.13 0.16 -0.01 -0.38 -0.04 -0.23 0.15 -0.04 -0.20 -0.10 0.26 0.80 1.00
14 ownership (% of stock held by exec) 0 1.69 0.35 0.22 -0.04 0.42 0.46 0.15 -0.03 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.10 1.00
15 board member indicator (1=director) 0 0.33 0.55 0.24 0.20 0.30 0.33 0.07 -0.04 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.04 -0.04 -0.12 0.55 1.00
Each variable has been mean-centered according to the mean value for all executives within the same firm.
n = 71; correlations of r = 0.20, 0.23, and 0.29 are significant at p ≤ 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.  Significant correlations are reported in bold.
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Main Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the main results, which consist of random effects regression 
models predicting executive compensation for the sample consisting of 71 executives 
from 36 firms.  Within the table, four models are presented in a stepwise manner. 
Model 1 includes only the individual- and firm-level control variables.  Model 2 
includes the control variables as well as the measures of generic human capital (H1) 
and generic social capital (H2).  Model 3 includes the control variables as well as the 
measures of firm-specific human capital (H3) and firm-specific social capital (H4).  
Finally, Model 4 includes all explanatory variables and represents a joint test of all 
four hypotheses.
Each model reported is statistically significant, and in each case, a Wald test 
confirmed that the explanatory variables of interest were jointly statistically 
significant beyond the control variables.  The model containing only the control 
variables explains a large portion of the variance in compensation (R2 = 0.7997), 
though the variance explained increases further with the introduction of the human 
capital and social capital variables (to R2 = 0.8318 in the full model).  For each 
model, a Hausman test confirmed that the assumptions upon which the random 
effects model is based on tenable (i.e., the coefficients as a group are not statistically 
different from those obtained with a fixed effects model).
In the following sections, the results pertaining to each hypothesis are 
discussed.  Note that significance tests reported in the table are one-tailed tests.
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Table 3: Main Results without Imputed Data: Random Effects Regression Predicting ln(Total Compensation)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no imputed data no imputed data no imputed data no imputed data
Control Variables Hypotheses 1 & 2 Control Variables Hypotheses 1-4
Generic Human Capital:
education, years 0.0162 0.0213 -0.0035 0.0218
breadth of experience, # industries 0.0927 *** 0.0342 0.0720 * 0.0329
Generic Social Capital:
external network size (# direct ties) 0.0011 *** 0.0003 0.0008 ** 0.0003
external network range (# categories) 0.0552 ** 0.0288 0.0401 † 0.0269
strength of external ties -0.0370 0.0257 -0.0326 0.0244
Firm-Specific Human Capital:
tenure in firm, years -0.0127 0.0260 -0.0094 0.0052
knowledge of org. processes -0.0048 0.6040 -0.0030 0.0091
Firm-Specific Social Capital:
strength of intra-TMT ties 0.0765 *** 0.0020 0.0541 ** 0.0243
internal network size (# direct ties) 0.0026 *** 0.0009 0.0013 † 0.0009
strength of internal ties -0.0813 0.0326 -0.0606 0.0311
criticality of internal ties 0.0722 † 0.0465 0.0863 * 0.0482
criticality of external ties 0.0688 † 0.0452 0.0773 * 0.0413
Control Variables:
ownership (% of stock held by exec.) -0.0049 0.0225 -0.0232 0.0193 0.0035 0.0184 -0.0102 0.0189
board member indicator (1 = inside director) 0.4454 *** 0.1249 0.3095 *** 0.1022 0.4747 *** 0.1035 0.3922 *** 0.0991
size, ln(revenue) 0.4543 *** 0.0431 0.4694 *** 0.0480 0.4429 *** 0.0488 0.4708 *** 0.0518
performance, 2-year stock returns 0.0007 ** 0.0002 0.0004 * 0.0002 0.0008 *** 0.0002 0.0006 ** 0.0002
profitability, ROE -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0003
growth, 2-year sales growth -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0006
governance; % of board named in CEO’s tenure 0.1032 0.2122 0.0448 0.2254 0.0575 0.2271 0.0628 0.2350
TMT size -0.1389 *** 0.0366 -0.1855 *** 0.0422 -0.1280 *** 0.0427 -0.1691 *** 0.0454
industry -0.3197 0.2682 -0.4592 † 0.2894 -0.3631 0.2912 -0.4230 0.3002
industry 0.0066 0.2359 -0.0626 0.2507 -0.0503 0.2591 -0.0772 0.2653
constant 10.9513 *** 0.3512 10.4613 *** 0.4087 10.8110 *** 0.0000 10.2869 *** 0.5271
Number of Executives; Number of Firms 71 36 71 36 71 36 71 36
Adjusted R-squared within; Wald X2 statistic 0.7997 156.14 0.8272 187.42 0.8118 186.04 0.8318 215.98
One-tailed significance tests:  † p < .10, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  Standard errors in italics.
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Hypothesis 1: Generic Human Capital
Hypothesis 1 states that generic human capital, measured by years of 
education and breadth of experience, will be positively related to executive 
compensation.  Education is not significantly related to compensation in spite of a 
high simple correlation (r = 0.40).  This result is consistent with much prior research 
and with the argument that education is a screening mechanism for top management 
positions, hence there is little variation among top managers in educational attainment 
(Leonard, 1990).  Breadth of experience is positively related to compensation.  Each 
additional industry in which an executive has experience is associated with an 
increase of 7% to 10% in compensation.  As a group, the two variables are 
significant, but since the coefficient for only one of the two measures of generic 
human capital is significant, hypothesis 1 is partially supported.
Hypothesis 2: Generic Social Capital
In hypothesis 2, I posited that generic social capital, measured by external 
network size, external network range, the strength of external ties, and the criticality 
of external ties, should be positively related to executive compensation.  The 
variables are significant as a group, and coefficients for two of the three measures of 
generic social capital are significantly related to compensation, although one of those 
(external network range) is only significant at p ≤ 0.10 in the full model.  These 
results provide support for hypothesis 2.  The more extensive an executive’s network 
of direct external social ties, the greater the executive’s compensation; each additional 
tie is associated with a 0.08% to 0.1% increase in compensation.  For external 
network range, each additional category in which an executive has developed social 
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ties is associated with an increase in compensation between 4% and 6.4%.  
Compensation was not significantly related to the strength of external ties.
Hypothesis 3: Firm-Specific Human Capital
Hypothesis 3 states that firm-specific human capital, measured by tenure in 
the firm and knowledge of organizational processes, will be positively related to 
executive compensation.  Neither variable is positively related to compensation in the 
regression models, and hypothesis 3 is not supported.  The measure of knowledge of 
organizational processes is positively correlated with compensation (r = 0.30), but the 
coefficient for this variable is not significant in the regression models.  Tenure, in 
contrast, is not significantly correlated with compensation, and the coefficient is 
negative and would be significant in some of the regression models (at p ≤ 0.10) 
using a two-tailed significance test in lieu of the one-tailed test for a positive relation 
that I utilized.  Further, tenure is not significantly related to knowledge of 
organizational processes, even though there are systematic differences in the latter 
variable between executives in different positions (i.e., CEOs and COOs exhibit 
greater knowledge of internal processes, whereas CFOs exhibit less firm-specific 
knowledge; likewise, inside directors appear to understand the inner workings of the 
firm better than their non-director peers in the TMT), as discussed above.  Together, 
these results support the arguments outlined in the theory section, in which I contend 
that tenure is a poor proxy for firm-specific human capital.  Again, the results provide 
no support for hypothesis 3.
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Hypothesis 4: Firm-Specific Social Capital
Hypothesis 4 states that firm-specific social capital, measured by the strength 
of intra-TMT ties, internal network size, the strength of internal ties, the criticality of 
internal ties, and the criticality of external ties is positively related to executive 
compensation.  The coefficients for these variables are significant as a group, and 
there is support for a link between compensation and intra-TMT tie strength (p ≤
0.01) as well as the number of direct internal ties (p ≤ 0.10).  Each additional internal 
tie is associated with an increase of 0.13% to 0.28% in compensation.  The rate of 
return to internal ties is higher than the return to external ties, but this difference is 
not statistically significant. The economic significance of the coefficient for tie 
strength is not as directly interpretable.  
The coefficient for the strength of internal ties is negative and would be 
significant in one of the two models if a two-tailed test of significance were used.  
The coefficient for the criticality of internal ties is positive and significant in one of 
the two models.  However, due to the high correlation between internal tie strength 
and the criticality of internal ties (r = 0.71), I tested unreported models in which each 
of these two variables was sequentially omitted.  In both cases, the coefficient for the 
remaining variable was not statistically significant.  It appears that any link found 
between internal tie strength and compensation or between the criticality of internal 
ties and compensation is merely a relic of the high correlation between the two 
explanatory variables. Finally, the criticality of external ties is significantly related to 
compensation, albeit at p < .10.  I conclude, therefore, that executive compensation is 
positively related to intra-TMT tie strength, internal network size and the criticality of 
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external ties but is not related to internal tie strength nor the criticality of internal ties.
Hypothesis 4, therefore receives some support, with three of five variables positively 
related to compensation.
Control Variables
Several of the control variables employed in the analysis are significantly 
related to compensation, and the control variables as a set explain a large portion of 
the variance in compensation.  In particular, firm size (i.e., the natural logarithm of 
revenue) is highly associated with compensation and independently explains a large 
portion of the variance.  This is consistent with most prior studies, except certain 
studies that use revenues as a sampling frame (e.g., Fortune 100 firms).  
Compensation was also positively related to an individual-level dummy variable 
indicating whether the executive was a member of the company’s board of directors, 
as well as with stock returns.  TMT size was also related to compensation, such that 
executives from larger teams received lower pay, ceteris paribus.  The coefficients for 
the remaining control variables were not significant.
Evaluating the Robustness of the Results: Alternative Models
Researchers inevitably confront decisions related to sampling, variable 
definition, and statistical methods that may influence the results of their analysis.  The 
present dissertation is no exception.
I have attempted to select the most appropriate methodology for the main 
results, as presented and justified above.  To assess the extent to which these results 
are dependent upon the methods employed, however, I have also evaluated a series of 
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alternative models.  Concordance of results between the models would indicate that 
the results are robust to differences in model specification.  Variation between models 
would increase the importance of justifying the ‘right’ approach.
Additional Tests for Robustness
In addition to evaluating models using the imputed compensation data, I 
report six additional models in Table 4 and Table 5.  Each model represents a change 
in the way a variable is operationalized or in the manner in which the regression 
model is specified.  In the remaining models (i.e., models 5-10), I
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Table 4: Tests for Robustness: Variations on Regression of ln(Total Compensation) without Imputed Data
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Exec. Comp. with Fixed Effects Reduced Number of Addition of Number of
Options Valued at 50% Control Variables Employees as Control Var.
Generic Human Capital:
education, years -0.013 0.0232 -0.0137 0.029 -0.0066 0.0229 -0.0035 0.0214
breadth of experience, # industries 0.067 * 0.0347 0.0678 * 0.039 0.0591 * 0.034 0.0692 * 0.0323
Generic Social Capital:
external network size (# direct ties) 0.0007 ** 0.0003 0.0007 * 0.0004 0.0006 * 0.0003 0.0007 ** 0.0003
external network range (# categories) 0.0389 † 0.0284 0.0418 † 0.032 0.0405 † 0.027 0.0405 † 0.0264
strength of external ties -0.0255 0.0256 -0.0234 0.0285 -0.0281 0.0255 -0.0318 0.0239
Firm-Specific Human Capital:
tenure in firm, years -0.0122 0.0055 -0.0124 0.0061 -0.0106 0.0054 -0.0099 0.0051
knowledge of org. processes -0.0061 0.0098 -0.0097 0.0133 0.0027 0.0095 -0.0026 0.009
Firm-Specific Social Capital:
strength of intra-TMT ties 0.0522 * 0.0257 0.0587 * 0.0292 0.0622 ** 0.024 0.0526 ** 0.0239
internal network size (# direct ties) 0.0021 * 0.001 0.0015 † 0.0011 0.0014 † 0.001 0.0013 † 0.0009
strength of internal ties -0.0738 0.0331 -0.0655 0.0411 -0.0593 0.0332 -0.059 0.0306
criticality of internal ties 0.1019 * 0.0512 0.0899 † 0.0636 0.0901 * 0.0513 0.0835 * 0.0473
criticality of external ties 0.0795 * 0.0434 0.086 * 0.0478 0.0909 * 0.0432 0.0768 * 0.0405
Control Variables:
ownership (% of stock held by exec.) -0.0125 0.02 -0.0013 0.023 -0.0114 0.0186
board member indicator (1 = inside director) 0.4042 *** 0.1043 0.4363 *** 0.1155 0.3839 *** 0.0963 0.4144 *** 0.098
size, ln(revenue) 0.5293 *** 0.0574 0.3741 *** 0.0511 0.4014 *** 0.0651
performance, 2-year stock returns 0.0006 ** 0.0003 0.0006 ** 0.0002
profitability, ROE -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003
growth, 2-year sales growth -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0006
governance; % of board named in CEO’s tenure 0.1127 0.2632 -0.0278 0.2365
TMT size -0.1977 *** 0.0505 -0.163 *** 0.0447
ln (number of employees in firm) 0.0959 * 0.0562
industry -0.4935 0.3369 -0.3945 0.2949
industry -0.0784 0.2968 0.0044 0.2645
constant 10.432 *** 0.5731 11.525 *** 0.4966 9.4956 *** 0.4395 10.638 *** 0.5562
Adjusted R-squared within; Wald X2 statistic 0.8375 214.15 0.8078 F=6.31 0.654 150.62 0.8458 227.49
One-tailed significance tests:  † p < .10, * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  Standard errors in italics.  Each model consists of 71 executives from 36 firms.
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Model 5 incorporates an alternative valuation of executive stock options.  
Whereas the main models value options at 25% of the exercise price, options are 
valued at 50% of the strike price for Model 5.  This is the same approach taken by 
Lambert et al (1993) and others, and most Black-Scholes valuations of options fall 
between these two values (Lewellen, Park & Ro, 1995).  The results of Model 5 are 
virtually identical to those produced in the main model (i.e., Model 4).  We can 
conclude that the method of valuing stock options does not have a material impact on 
the regression results.
Although the Hausman test failed to show a significant difference between the 
reported random effects models and the equivalent fixed effects regression, I report 
the results of the fixed effects regression in Model 6.  For this model, only individual-
level control variables are included, since fixed effects models cannot accommodate 
variables for which there is no within-group variation.  Otherwise, the results of 
Model 6 are entirely consistent with the main model, Model 4.
For the main model in which imputed data are excluded, the sample size is 71 
and independent variables include 12 variables related to the hypotheses and 10 
control variables.  While this model produces meaningful results that are consistent 
with the theory, the statistical power of the model is limited and the large number of 
explanatory and control variables is a legitimate concern.  To evaluate the extent to 
which the results of Models 1-4 were dependent upon the inclusion or exclusion of 
certain control variables, I systematically evaluated each variable employed in the 
analysis.  In Model 7, I report the results of a regression incorporating a minimal 
number of control variables.  Specifically, the model includes one individual-level 
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variable (board membership) and two firm-level variables (firm size and financial 
performance).  It was not sensible to omit these variables, since doing so yields a 
significant Hausman test and indicates that the assumptions upon which random 
effects regression are based are untenable.  In order for the model to be properly 
specified, these variables must be included in the analysis.  The results indicate that in 
spite of modest changes in coefficients and significance levels, the results of the main 
model are robust to the inclusion and/or exclusion of all control variables except firm 
size, performance, and executive directorship status.
I also include a model which includes the addition of another control variable: 
the natural logarithm of the number of employees.  There are two reasons to believe 
that it might be important to control for the number of employees.  First, in the human 
capital-intensive industries in which these firms compete, employees are perhaps the 
best measure of the firm’s valuable assets.  Second, some of the social capital 
variables (particularly internal network size) may be dependent on the number of 
employees in a firm, rather than revenues.  I first investigated the possibility of using 
the number of employees as a control for firm size in lieu of revenue.  I found that the 
number of employees was correlated with revenue at r = .92, and with internal 
network size at r = .24; it was not significantly related to any of the other social 
capital variables.  However, I found that by replacing firm revenues with the number 
of employees, the Hausman test failed, indicating that the assumptions upon which 
the random effects model is based were no longer tenable.  In other words, removing 
revenue from the regression model causes it to be mis-specified, even when the 
number of employees is included.  When the random effects model is mis-specified 
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and the Hausman test fails, the typical recourse is to use a fixed effects model, which 
excludes firm-level variables but includes dummy variables for each firm.  Therefore, 
in spite of the high correlation between firm revenues and employees, I report a 
regression in which both variables are included (Model 8).  The coefficient for the 
number of employees is positive and significant, and the coefficient for revenues 
remains significant.  Otherwise, the main results from Model 4 continue to hold.
Table 5 includes the final two tests for robustness.  In Model 9, I replace the 
internal network size variable with a measure of the density of internal social 
networks.  Density is computed as the ratio of internal network size to the number of 
employees; as such, it is constrained to values between 0 and 1.  From a conceptual 
perspective, a density measure has some appeal and captures a slightly different 
construct.  Beyond controlling for the maximum number of internal ties (i.e., the 
number of employees; see above), this variable depicts the degree to which an 
executive is well-connected within the firm in a relative rather than absolute sense.  
When including the density measure, I have omitted the internal network size variable 
to avoid multicollinearity.  Although the two variables are only modestly correlated, 
at r = 0.17, internal network size is the numerator in the ratio used to compute 
density.  Empirically, the density measure does not produce significant results, 
whereas the coefficient for the simple count of internal ties generally does produce 
significant results.  The density measure applies only to internal ties and not to 
external ties, since the maximum number of external ties is not bounded.  
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Table 5: Tests for Robustness Using Alternative Measures for Independent Variables
Model 9 Model 10
internal network uniqueness of external
density & internal ties
Generic Human Capital:
education, years -0.0067 0.0223 -0.004 0.0226
breadth of experience, # industries 0.0751 ** 0.0341 0.0628 * 0.0338
Generic Social Capital:
external network size (# direct ties) 0.001 *** 0.0003
external network range (# categories) 0.0455 * 0.0276 0.0529 * 0.0272
strength of external ties -0.033 0.0252 -0.0205 0.0254
Firm-Specific Human Capital:
tenure in firm, years -0.0082 0.0054 -0.0088 0.0054
knowledge of org. processes -0.0016 0.0095 -0.0014 0.0094
Firm-Specific Social Capital:
strength of intra-TMT ties 0.0506 * 0.0252 0.0625 ** 0.0249
internal network size (# direct ties)
density, internal (internal ties as % of employees) 0.0011 0.3117
uniqueness of internal ties (distance from average) 0.0224 ** 0.0094
uniqueness of external ties (distance from average) 0.0023 † 0.0017
strength of internal ties -0.0705 0.0313 -0.0588 0.0329
criticality of internal ties 0.1159 ** 0.0454 0.074 † 0.0494
criticality of external ties 0.0817 * 0.0426 0.0813 * 0.0429
Control Variables:
ownership (% of stock held by exec.) -0.0158 0.0207 -0.011 0.0207
board member indicator (1 = inside director) 0.3817 *** 0.1034 0.3781 *** 0.1028
size, ln(revenue) 0.4745 *** 0.0523 0.4661 *** 0.053
performance, 2-year stock returns 0.0005 ** 0.0002 0.0007 ** 0.0002
profitability, ROE -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0003
growth, 2-year sales growth -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0006
governance; % of board named in CEO’s tenure 0.0998 0.2416 0.0708 0.2402
TMT size -0.1755 *** 0.0457 -0.157 *** 0.0459
industry -0.4105 0.3003 -0.4549 0.3088
industry -0.0499 0.2661 -0.086 0.2726
constant 10.132 *** 0.5258 10.277 *** 0.542
Number of Executives; Number of Firms 71 36 71 36
Adjusted R-squared within; Wald X2 statistic 82.99 206.79 0.8214 200.72
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The final test of robustness concerns internal network size as well as external 
network size.  To this point in the analysis, I have focused on these constructs in 
theoretical and empirical terms as absolute measures of network size, and they are 
represented by count measures of the number of direct ties each executive maintains 
with internal and external alters.  Rather than focusing on absolute measures of 
network size, however, it may be more valuable to focus on the extent to which a 
given executive’s network is unique in the sense that the executive is tied to contacts 
(or ‘types’ of contacts) with whom other TMT members are not connected.  Such a 
measure would more closely approximate Burt’s (1991) conception of structural 
equivalence and the position of the ‘tertius gaudens’, the actor who is able to benefit 
by brokering information exchange between two disconnected parties.  It may be 
argued that within-firm uniqueness would matter more for firm-specific resources 
than for generic resources.  In the case of generic resources, what likely matters most 
is whether there is a market value for the resources, or in other words, how unique or 
redundant are the resources in the overall labor market?  In the case of firm-specific 
resources, on the other hand, scarcity within the firm is likely to matter more.  In 
either case, however, executives may be able to gain higher returns from contacts that 
bridge structural holes than from ties that are structurally equivalent to those 
maintained by other executives in the TMT.
While the random effects regression technique utilized in the analysis partially 
accounts for and estimates the degree to which a given executive is unique in terms of 
network characteristics, relative to peers within the same TMT, this is done in an 
indirect fashion.  In order to account more directly for the intra-firm uniqueness of 
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each executive’s external and internal networks, I first calculated the firm-level mean 
number of contacts held by TMT members in each firm for each of the nine external 
categories of ties as well as for the four internal categories of ties.  I then computed a 
single measure of the extent to which each executive exceeded the average number of 
ties in each category.  I measured the ‘distance’ between each executive and the mean 
by taking the Euclidean distance of the focal executive’s ties minus the average 
number of ties in each category (i.e., the sum of the squared amount of ‘surplus’ ties 
within each category).  Ties were only considered unique if the executive exceeded 
the TMT average (i.e., executives with fewer ties than the mean were treated as if 
they had the average number of ties).  The resulting measures were highly correlated 
with the corresponding simple count measures of network size: external network size 
was correlated with the uniqueness of external ties at r = 0.86, while internal network 
size was correlated with the uniqueness of internal ties at r = 0.58.
In Model 10, I enter the uniqueness of ties measures into the regressions and 
omit the corresponding network size variables.  As shown in Table 5, the results are 
very similar to the results of the main model.  Like external network size, the 
coefficient for the uniqueness of external ties is positive and significant, albeit at a 
lower level of significance.  As in the case of internal network size, the coefficient for 
the uniqueness of internal ties is positive and significant.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
The results of the empirical analysis provide broad support for three of the 
four hypotheses advanced in this dissertation.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
executive compensation was found to be positively related to one of two measures of 
generic human capital: the number of industries in which each executive has 
accumulated experience.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, compensation was found to 
be positively related to two of three indicators of generic social capital: external 
network size and the range of external ties.  Consistent with Hypothesis 4, 
compensation was found to be positively related to three of five measures of firm-
specific social capital: the strength of intra-TMT ties, internal network size , and the 
criticality of external ties.  The analysis did not provide support for Hypothesis 3, in 
which I argued that executive compensation should be positively related to firm-
specific human capital.
In this final chapter, I discuss the implications of these results for research and 
practice, as well as some unresolved remaining issues.
General Contributions and Strengths
Aside from contributing to specific research streams as outlined below, the 
present study features several strengths.  First, the analysis is based on a field study 
which elicited detailed information from executives to capture constructs that are 
often represented by loosely-related proxies (e.g., social capital is assessed here by 
network ties rather than inferred from board and/or club memberships), as well as to 
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capture multiple dimensions of human and social capital.  This enables us to move 
beyond the question of ‘Do human and social capital matter in the determination of 
executive compensation?’ to now address ‘Which dimensions of human capital and 
social capital matter in the determination of executive compensation?’  Second, the 
sample includes executives from a cross-section of publicly-traded firms, rather than 
a single firm.  Third, while the independent variables are obtained from self-reported 
sources in order to accurately measure human capital and social capital, these 
variables are matched against a dependent variable that is obtained from an external 
source—executive compensation data filed with the SEC.  Fourth, the results of the 
analysis are generally robust to alternative approaches, including a different method 
of valuing stock options, fixed effects regression, the inclusion and exclusion of 
control variables, and the substitution of alternative explanatory variables which 
operationalize the underlying constructs in different ways.
I have provided theoretical and empirical support for a causal relationship 
between human and social capital and executive compensation.  The establishment of
causal relationships rather than simple correlations is often a challenge; this is 
particularly true for executive compensation.  Compensation varies little over time: 
annual observations of executive compensation often correlate at 0.90 or higher, 
which diminishes the potential value of longitudinal research.  For this study, several 
factors help support the conclusion that human and social capital lead to executive 
compensation.  First and foremost, the theoretical mechanisms outlined in chapter 3 
specify that value is embedded in and created through the deployment of resources 
including human capital and social capital; executives appropriate a portion of the 
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value they bring to the table through their compensation.  In terms of the empirical 
analysis, the dependent and independent variables are obtained from distinct sources, 
alternative variables and analytical methods yield robust results, and the executives’ 
resources have been evaluated on the basis of primary data rather than archival 
proxies.  This point is particularly important in the case of social capital, since 
archival proxies of social capital are generally status-based (e.g., number and type of 
board and club memberships), and status attainment can just as easily be viewed as 
being influenced by both social capital and compensation, rather than as a proxy for 
social capital (Lin, 1999).
The Cost of Strategic Resources and the Resource-Based View of the Firm
Within the resource-based view of the firm, resources that are firm-specific, 
socially complex and intangible are theorized to be more likely to yield sustainable 
competitive advantages (Barney, 1991).  However, research indicates that the same 
types of resources are also likely to be more difficult to manage (Coff, 1997), and 
these attributes may create greater possibilities for value to be appropriated by 
internal stakeholders other than shareholders.  In particular, top managers may be 
well-positioned to reap the benefits generated from the human capital and social 
capital they contribute to their firms.
More generally, there is a need within RBV-related research to better 
understand the cost of strategic resources.  As noted in Chapter 1, multiple and often 
conflicting definitions of competitive advantage exist, but most incorporate the notion 
of value creation exceeding actual costs or opportunity costs.  Studying the value of 
strategic resources is useful only if one also understands the cost of strategic 
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resources.  Are the dimensions of strategic resources that lead to value creation also 
the dimensions of strategic resources that generate costs for firms?  Most extant 
research has been predicated on a tight coupling between value creation and value 
appropriation.  For instance, Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein (2001) explicitly 
assume that the set of executive-level resources that lead to value creation also drive 
executive compensation.  This need not be the case, however.  Instead, it may be that 
certain dimensions of human/social capital are associated with both value creation 
and executive compensation, certain others create value for firms but are do not 
generate additional compensation for executives, and certain others allow executives 
to command higher compensation but do not contribute to firm performance.  
The present study begins to address this issue by identifying the dimensions of 
executive human capital and social capital that are associated with elevated 
compensation expenditures for firms. My approach explicitly accommodates and 
evaluates the possibility that individual executives will appropriate value that would 
otherwise be accrued by shareholders.  As such, this approach is a response to a 
recent call by Blyler and Coff (2003) for empirical research that does not treat firms 
as monolithic entities and that considers the role of managerial resources such as 
social capital in value appropriation.  My findings indicate that executive human 
capital and social capital are associated with tangible monetary expenses borne by 
shareholders.  Prior research has told only half of the story by focusing exclusively on 
the benefits of strategic resources.  As a result of these findings, future research must 
account for the costs of developing and deploying intangible resources if we are to 
develop a testable resource-based theory of competitive advantage.
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Executive Compensation: The Influence of Human Capital
This study provides several direct contributions to research on executive 
compensation.  Whereas an extensive body of research on the returns to human 
capital across the general population has consistently found a significant relation 
between human capital and income (Becker, 1993), findings have been less consistent 
at the executive level (Combs & Skill, 2003).  It appears implausible that human 
capital should somehow matter less at higher levels of the organization than it does at 
lower levels.  Instead, others have interpreted these inconsistent findings as evidence 
that the type of human capital that matters at the executive level is not effectively 
captured by simple measures such as years of education, number of degrees obtained 
and organizational tenure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  In this study, I have 
introduced new measures of human capital to capture the inter-industry breadth of 
executive experience and executives’ tacit knowledge of organizational processes.
Obtaining a more complete picture of executive human capital has enabled a more 
complete albeit complex understanding of executive compensation.
Firm-Specific Human Capital and Executive Compensation: Non-Significant 
Findings 
One complex and surprising feature of the results is the lack of a significant 
relation between firm-specific human capital and executive compensation.  While 
hypothesis testing standards caution against the over-interpretation of non-significant 
results, two potential explanations include methodological issues and theoretical 
rationale.
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From a methodological standpoint, three potential factors include 
measurement error, sampling bias, and inadequate statistical power.  Measurement 
error may explain the lack of a relation between tenure and compensation, since 
tenure can also be an indicator of inertia, power, and entrenchment (Hill & Phan, 
1991; Barkema & Pennings, 1998).  But the second measure of firm-specific human 
capital, which assesses the extent to which an executive’s understanding of 
organizational knowledge processes concurs with the judgments of other TMT 
members, is less likely to be confounded with these other constructs.  Second, 
sampling bias may result if the companies and industries sampled are less likely to 
value firm-specific human capital than are other companies and industries.  The 
sample is comprised of executives from a range of firms that operate within three 
separate high-tech industries (i.e., information and communication technology, 
biotech/biomedical, and engineering), so for bias to occur, high technology firms 
would need to value firm-specific human capital less than do firms using mature 
technologies.  This possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, since technology firms 
may rely heavily upon resources that are specialized to an industry but not to the firm 
itself, yet it seems improbable that high-tech firms would benefit less from the 
deployment of firm-specific knowledge than would low-tech firms.  Further, high 
tech industries are more likely to base general compensation systems on external 
equity (i.e., external labor market) rather than internal equity (i.e., distributive justice 
among internal stakeholders) models (Gomez-Mejia, 1997); it is possible that firm-
specific resources relate more closely to an internal equity model.  The third potential 
methodological explanation is that the actual effect size of firm-specific human 
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capital on compensation is too small to be detected in a sample of 71 executives.  I 
cannot rule out this possibility entirely.
From a theoretical perspective, why might firm-specific human capital such as 
knowledge of organizational processes not yield positive returns for executives?  The 
answer may lie in both economic and social processes.  From an economic 
perspective, firm-specific resources do not convey market power, decreasingly the 
likelihood of an executive making a credible threat to put the resources to use in 
another firm for greater pay.  But why would firm-specific human capital yield no 
returns when multiple dimensions of firm-specific social capital are significantly 
related to compensation?  One possibility is that these social resources convey 
legitimacy, social influence, and social comparisons, while knowledge resources do 
not.  Similarly, relevant stakeholders (i.e., compensation committee members and the 
CEO) may be incapable of assessing the firm-specific knowledge of individual 
executives.
Executive Compensation: The Influence of Social Capital
Four factors set the present study apart from prior research linking executive 
compensation to social capital.  First, this is the only study to include both internal 
social networks and external social networks, thereby incorporating both generic and 
firm-specific forms of social capital.  On a related note, this is the first study to 
provide a theoretical framework justifying why both generic and firm-specific forms 
of social capital should be linked to compensation.  Third, this study employs 
measures of social capital that move beyond ambiguous but commonly-used variables 
that confound multiple constructs (e.g., external board ties, membership in elite clubs 
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and other measures of status).  Measures of status are not ideal proxies for social 
capital, and they introduce doubts concerning the direction of causality: status is often 
considered an outcome of compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Finally, 
this is the first study to link compensation to the social ties of executives in a cross-
section of publicly-traded US firms.  Specifically, I find that executives receive 
higher compensation when they have larger external networks, external ties with a 
more diverse range of contacts, external ties with important alters, larger internal 
networks, stronger ties to others in the TMT and criticality of external ties.  Thus, 
both generic and firm-specific forms of social capital affect an executive’s ability to 
appropriate rents.
Strong Ties and the Dark Side of Social Capital
While most social capital research focuses on the socially productive or 
‘bright’ side of social capital, researchers have begun to acknowledge and analyze the 
‘dark side’ of social capital, of which there are three main elements.  First, strong 
social ties lead to strong social norms, cognitive convergence (i.e., groupthink), and 
obligations, which may in turn cloud one’s judgment and constrain an individual’s 
ability to adapt to changing task environments and to transmit and receive 
information (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2001; Hansen, 1999).  Second, interpersonal 
relations take time and effort to create and maintain, hence the benefits individuals 
accrue through social capital are accompanied by tangible and opportunity costs 
(McFadyen & Cannella, 2004).  Third, the private costs and benefits of social capital 
may not correspond perfectly with the social costs and benefits of social capital.  
Specifically, negative externalities may arise from the existence of ‘old boys’ 
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networks (Locke, 1999), which may exist as mechanisms for value appropriation 
rather than value creation (Blyler & Coff, 2003).  Note that each of the three elements 
imply that strong ties are likely to have a more substantial dark side than will weak 
ties: strong ties may be more constraining, more costly in a private sense (i.e., more 
costly for an individual executive), and more costly in a social sense (i.e., more costly 
to other stakeholders in the executive’s firm).
The present research introduces new insights and new questions regarding the 
dark side of social capital, particularly as concerns strong social ties.  For individual 
executives, investments in certain elements of social capital yield positive returns 
(i.e., external network size, external network range, strength of intra-TMT ties, 
internal network range, criticality of external and internal ties), while others do not 
(i.e., strength of external ties, strength of internal ties).  Interestingly, the strength of 
ties is significantly related to compensation only for intra-TMT ties.  Since strong ties 
are more costly to maintain, strong ties outside the TMT (i.e., ties within the firm but 
outside the TMT, as well as ties outside the firm) feature a dark side for executives: 
executives yield no return on their investment.  In terms of intra-TMT ties, on the 
other hand, executives are compensated for maintaining strong ties.  At the social 
level (i.e., in terms of shareholders and other non-executive stakeholders of the firm), 
strong executive ties to alters outside the TMT do not present a dark side (i.e., the 
firm does not compensate executives for maintaining strong ties outside the TMT).  
Two possible explanations for these findings exist.  From one perspective, 
strong intra-TMT ties create more value than do strong ties to other internal 
stakeholders and to external parties, and executive value appropriation is simply
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commensurate with value creation.  Evidence exists to support the hypothesis that the 
relation between tie strength and value creation is contingent upon the type of tie.  
Prior research has shown that strong ties are more effective for the transfer of 
complex and emotionally sensitive information, whereas weak ties are more effective 
for introducing new information (Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992; Hansen, 
1999).  It is plausible that intra-TMT ties are more valuabl e for their ability to enable 
the integration of complex and emotionally sensitive information (thus requiring 
strong ties), while ties outside the TMT are more valuable for their ability to 
introduce novel information to the upper echelon of the firm (thus requiring large and 
diverse networks of ties).
Alternatively, it may be that differences in value appropriation are driving 
these findings.  Independent of differences in value creation, tie strength may yield 
appropriable benefits for executives only in the case of intra-TMT ties.  First, strong 
ties entail norms and obligations.  Executives may find it more costly and less 
beneficial to be beholden to individuals from lower levels of the firm and from 
outside the firm than to other TMT members.  Strong intra-TMT ties may create an 
‘old boys’ network, whereby all members are mutually indebted.  In such a system, 
executives are likely to promote the use of social comparison in executive 
compensation—encouraging higher salaries for close peers will then help elevate 
one’s own compensation.
More generally, it is important that future research consider not only the 
implications of strong ties on value creation but also on value appropriation.  As 
discussed above, a series of studies have now shown strong ties to be more effective 
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means of channeling certain types of information.  Moreover, researchers have begun 
to identify other nuances in the relation between strength of ties and value creation.  
McFadyen and Cannella (2004), for instance, recently found that tie strength is 
positively related to knowledge creation for biomedical researchers until tie strength 
exceeds the mean by 0.6 standard deviations, at which point it begins to be negatively 
related to knowledge creation.  In other words, at low and moderate levels, tie 
strength is positively related to knowledge creation, but the relation becomes negative 
at high levels of tie strength. Together, these studies shed light on the process by 
which the type and strength of social ties are related to value creation, but they do not 
generally specify whether the ensuing value is accrued by individuals or their firms.  
Future research should explore how the dual processes of value creation and value 
appropriation are impacted by factors such as the strength and type of ties.
Firm-Specificity of Intangible Resources
Well- established streams of research substantiate the theoretical significance 
and practical implications of the concept of asset specificity.  In transaction cost 
economics, asset specificity serves as the foundation of a theory of the firm.  Labor 
economics distinguishes between generic and specific resources in order to 
investigate the associated variation in rates of return and incentive structures, as well 
as the impact on performance at the organizational and societal levels.  Within 
strategy, the resource-based view of the firm is centrally concerned with the 
development and exploitation of firm-specific resources (Barney, 1991; Ghemawat, 
1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992).
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Firm-specific resources are generally defined as assets that have positive value 
within one firm but zero value in the second-best application (Klein et al, 1978).  
Although the concept of firm-specificity plays a major role in theories within 
economics and management and can be defined clearly in a theoretical sense, from a 
more practical perspective purely firm-specific assets are rare at best and non-existent 
at worst.  As Lazear (2003) recounts, when pressed for examples of firm-specific 
human capital, labor economists conjure up contrived or vague examples such as 
‘knowing how to find the restrooms’, ‘learning who does what at the firm and to 
whom to go to get something done’, and ‘learning to use equipment or methods that 
are completely idiosyncratic.’  He argues that truly firm-specific resources may not 
exist; instead, resources exhibit varying degrees of specialization, and the human 
capital of certain individuals appears to be firm-specific because it contains elements 
that are specialized to teams or processes within a single firm, and because the 
resources needed to thrive within a given firm may include a unique basket of generic 
resources (e.g., a unique pairing of resources that are not themselves firm-specific, 
such as knowledge of tax laws, computer software, and managing R&D teams 
possessed by a manager in a company developing specialized tax software). 
 The distinction between generic and specific resources, therefore, is oddly as 
vague as it is important.  If a manager has developed specialized resources, are those 
resources truly firm-specific (in which case the executive is unlikely to be able to 
appropriate most of the value), or are they specialized resources that may be valuable 
in other firms?  In the present study, I introduced hypotheses linking executive 
compensation to 5 measures of generic human/social capital and 7 measures of firm-
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specific human/social capital.  I found significant, positive relations between 
executive compensation and three generic resources (i.e., breadth of experience, 
external network size, external network range).  I have also found significant, positive 
linkages between compensation and three measures of firm-specific resources (i.e., 
intra-TMT tie strength and internal network size the criticality of external ties).  
Which matters more in explaining compensation: generic or firm-specific resources?  
Are these resources truly generic/firm-specific?
Regarding the first question, the evidence does not indicate a significant 
difference between generic and firm-specific resources as a whole.  When entered 
sequentially, the two sets of variables explain a similar portion of the remaining 
variance.  The only generic and firm-specific assets that are in the same scale, 
external network size and internal network size, yield coefficients that are not 
significantly different.  Therefore I conclude that both generic and firm-specific 
resources have a significant impact on executive compensation, and neither one plays 
a more important role than the other.
In terms of the second question, attempting to completely discriminate 
between generic and firm-specific resources may prove to be an unproductive 
exercise.  The most firm-specific resources are bound to have a generic component: 
social ties within the firm may continue to be of some use to a departing executive, 
and knowledge of a firm’s internal processes may be useful for benchmarking internal 
processes in other firms.  Likewise, the most generic resources can take on a firm-
specific dimension.  Firms are configurations or bundles of resources, many of which 
are generic and some of which are firm-specific.  The most generic resources may be 
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assessed in terms of their uniqueness in broader factor markets (e.g., by assessing the 
going rate for corporate attorneys) or in terms of their uniqueness within the 
configuration of a single firm (e.g., the uniqueness of an attorney’s skill set within the 
firm and/or the criticality of those skills in light of the firms legal needs).
Intra-Organizational Value Appropriation
Empirical support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 indicates that executives 
appropriate a portion of the value they contribute to their firms through generic 
human capital, generic social capital, and firm-specific social capital.  The amount 
they appropriate is far from trivial: TMT compensation equates to 16.8% of net 
income for the average firm in the sample.  The role of individual resources in value 
appropriation is also economically significant.  For the average executive (e.g., 
$622,760 in annual income), each industry in which the executive has experience is 
associated with $45,000 in additional compensation.  Each external tie is associated 
with $500 in annual compensation, while internal ties are associated with 
approximately $800 in pay.  Being connected to an additional type of external party is 
associated with $25,000 in compensation.  Lastly, increases of a standard deviation in 
intra-TMT tie strength and the criticality of external ties are associated with 
compensation increases of $77,000 and $50,000, respectively. 
As significant as these sums are in economic terms, the evidence does not 
indicate what share of the value is appropriated by executives and how this compares 
to value being appropriated by other stakeholders, or whether or not the arrangement 
is functional in the sense of promoting efficient resource allocation.  Do executives 
appropriate the ‘right’ amount of value—just enough to give them the incentive to use 
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their resources to create value for the firm?  Or do executives leverage their human 
capital and social capital to extract value that would otherwise accrue to shareholders 
or other stakeholders, perhaps even destroying value along the way?  What happens 
to executives who are not able to appropriate value from the resources they control?  
Over time, does this increase the likelihood of turnover and reduce the rate of 
investment in new firm-specific resources?
Unfortunately, the present study cannot provide definitive answers to these 
questions.  Future research should explore the issue of identifying who gets the rents.  
In order to address this research question, the research must be explicitly multi-level 
in design, and must allow for unequal rates of return between stakeholders.  It is 
entirely plausible that the accumulation and deployment of certain resources will 
benefit executives at the expense of their firms’ shareholders, or vice versa.  For 
instance, Staw and Epstein (2000) found that the adoption of popular management 
techniques lead to an increase in executives’ reputation and compensation but had a 
negative or non-significant impact on firm performance.  Further evidence of this sort 
would reinforce the need to avoid the assumption that rents are shared, which is too 
common of an approach in strategy research.
Implications for Practice
Managers and shareholders need to better understand the payoffs from
different sorts of investments in intangible resources.  Although research has begun to 
shed light on the linkage between human and social capital and performance (Becker, 
1993; Collins and Clark, 2003), decisions concerning policies to build human and 
social capital may rest on knowledge of who receives the benefits.  For example, 
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decisions to invest in executives with broad industry experience must be weighed 
against the probability that they will be able to extract considerable additional 
compensation than others with more specific experiences.  Moreover, executives who 
have developed large, diverse external networks can also demand greater 
compensation.  The question must be asked whether these networks confer greater 
value than their costs, especially when such executives pose a greater threat to leave 
the firm by virtue of these same networks.  Each firm should assess the net value of 
these resources for the firm after accounting for executive value appropriation: which 
resources are worth the added expense? Moreover, recent scandals in public 
corporations have underscored the need for greater oversight of executive behavior.  
Shareholders and other stakeholders should be wary of the governance implications 
of cozy relations within the TMT.  Where executives’ personal interrelationships 
inhibit critical and objective assessment of worth, compensation abuses may occur.
For individual executives, the implications are even less ambiguous.  Simply 
put, it pays to develop certain types of personal resources.  Executives who seek to 
increase their compensation should invest in certain forms of human capital (i.e., 
cross-industry experience) rather than others (i.e., formal education, tenure, 
knowledge of organizational processes).  Similarly, the pay-off to investments in 
certain forms of social capital is positive (i.e., large and broad external networks, 
large internal networks, strong ties within the TMT, and ties to critical internal and 
external parties), while other investments yield no noticeable monetary benefits (i.e., 
strong external ties, strong ties to internal parties other than TMT members).  These 
results show that it pays to act as a ‘free agent’ by moving between industries in order 
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to obtain experience and contacts, and to maintain extensive social networks with 
diverse sources.  Strong ties are not essential in these areas—the benefits of the 
increased conductivity of strong ties may be negated by the costs of maintaining such 
ties and the greater likelihood of redundancy.  At the same time, however, executives 
can profit from understanding and exploiting their firm’s unique environment, which 
may be accomplished by developing ties with critical internal and external 
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